Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:162-163 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000818

Open Peer Commentary

Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism


David M. Williamsa1, Sophie E. Linda2 and Francesca Happéa3

a1 Institute of Child Health, University College London, London, WC1N 1EH, United Kingdom d.williams@ich.ucl.ac.uk
a2 Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom Sophie.Lind.1@city.ac.uk
a3 Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, United Kingdom. f.happe@iop.kcl.ac.uk
Article author query
williams dm [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
lind se [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
happé f [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/


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