Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2009 - Volume 32, Issue 02  

Cambridge Journals Online - CUP Full-Text Page
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:158-159 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000776

Open Peer Commentary

Overlooking metacognitive experience

Joëlle Prousta1

a1 Department of Cognitive Studies, Ecole Normale Supérieure, and Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS and ENS, 75005 Paris, France. jproust@ehess.fr http://joelleproust.hautetfort.com
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Abstract

Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/