Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2009 - Volume 32, Issue 02  

Cambridge Journals Online - CUP Full-Text Page
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:156-157 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000752

Open Peer Commentary

Global broadcasting and self-interpretation

David Pereplyotchika1

a1 Department of Philosophy, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York, NY 10010. res.cogitans@gmail.com
Article author query
pereplyotchik d [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

Carruthers claims that global workspace theory implies that sensory states, unlike propositional attitudes, are introspectible in a non-interpretative fashion. I argue that this claim is false, and defend a strong version of the “mindreading is prior” model of first-person access, according to which the self-ascription of all mental states, both propositional and sensory, is interpretative.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/