Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:152-153 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000715

Open Peer Commentary

What neuroimaging and perceptions of self-other similarity can tell us about the mechanism underlying mentalizing


Michael V. Lombardoa1, Bhismadev Chakrabartia1 and Simon Baron-Cohena1

a1 Autism Research Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 8AH, United Kingdom. ml437@cam.ac.uk bhisma@cantab.net sb205@cam.ac.uk http://www.autismresearchcentre.com
Article author query
lombardo mv [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
chakrabarti b [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
baron-cohen s [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

Carruthers' “mindreading is prior” model postulates one unitary mindreading mechanism working identically for self and other. While we agree about shared mindreading mechanisms, there is also evidence from neuroimaging and mentalizing about dissimilar others that suggest factors that differentially affect self-versus-other mentalizing. Such dissociations suggest greater complexity than the mindreading is prior model allows.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/


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