Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2009 - Volume 32, Issue 02  

Cambridge Journals Online - CUP Full-Text Page
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:150-151 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000685

Open Peer Commentary

What monkeys can tell us about metacognition and mindreading

Nate Kornella1, Bennett L. Schwartza2 and Lisa K. Sona3

a1 Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563 nkornell@ucla.edu http://nkornell.bol.ucla.edu/
a2 Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199 bennett.schwartz@fiu.edu www.fiu.edu/~schwartb
a3 Department of Psychology, Barnard College, New York, NY 10027 lson@barnard.edu http://lisason.synthasite.com/index.php
Article author query
kornell n [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
schwartz bl [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
son lk [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

Thinkers in related fields such as philosophy, psychology, and education define metacognition in a variety of different ways. Based on an emerging standard definition in psychology, we present evidence for metacognition in animals, and argue that mindreading and metacognition are largely orthogonal.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/