Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:148-149 Cambridge University Press
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Open Peer Commentary

Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

Bryce Huebnera1a2 and Daniel C. Dennetta1

a1 Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155
a2 Cognitive Evolution Laboratory, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Article author query
huebner b [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
dennett dc [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]


Carruthers offers a promising model for how “we” know the propositional contents of “our” own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already “in the loop.” We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742