Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:148-149 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000661

Open Peer Commentary

Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition


Bryce Huebnera1a2 and Daniel C. Dennetta1

a1 Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155 huebner@wjh.harvard.edu http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~huebner
a2 Cognitive Evolution Laboratory, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. daniel.dennett@tufts.edu http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incbios/dennettd/dennettd.htm
Article author query
huebner b [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
dennett dc [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

Carruthers offers a promising model for how “we” know the propositional contents of “our” own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already “in the loop.” We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/


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