Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:147-148 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X0900065X

Open Peer Commentary

There must be more to development of mindreading and metacognition than passing false belief tasks


Mikolaj Hernika1, Pasco Fearona2 and Peter Fonagya3

a1 Baby Lab, Anna Freud Centre, London, NW3 5SD, United Kingdom mikolaj.hernik@annafreud.org http://www.annafreudcentre.org/infantlab/mhernik
a2 School of Psychology and Clinical Language Sciences, University of Reading, Reading, RG6 6AL, United Kingdom r.m.p.fearon@reading.ac.uk http://www.reading.ac.uk/psychology/about/staff/r-m-p-fearon.asp
a3 Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk http://www.ucl.ac.uk/psychoanalysis/unit-staff/peter.htm
Article author query
hernik m [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
fearon p [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
fonagy p [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/


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