Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2009 - Volume 32, Issue 02  

Cambridge Journals Online - CUP Full-Text Page
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:145-146 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000636

Open Peer Commentary

How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts

Keith Frankisha1

a1 Department of Philosophy, The Open University, Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire MK7 6AA, United Kingdom. k.frankish@open.ac.uk http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/philos/frankish.htm
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frankish k [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/