(1) See the author's article, The Clerical Estate and the Emergence of a Shi'ite Hierocracy in Iran, Safavid: a study in historical sociology, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (forthcoming, 1981)Google Scholar.

(2) For an account of popular Sufism and its suppression, see Arjomand, S.A., Reli- gious Extremism (Ghuluww), Sufism and Sunnism in Iran, Safavid: 1501–1722, Journal of Asian History, XV (1981)Google Scholar.

(3) Sayyid, ‘Abd al-Husayn Khātōn-ābādī, Waqāyi’ al-Sanīn wa'l-A'wām, ed. by Bihbūdi, M.B. (Tehran 1973/1352), pp. 559–566Google Scholar.

(4) See GIbb, H.A.R. and Bowen, H., Islamic Society and the West (London 1957), chGoogle Scholar.

(5) See Arjomand, S.A., Religion, Poli- tical Action and Legitimate Domination in Shi'te Iran: fourteenth to eighteenth centuries A.D., European Journal of Socio-logy, XX (1979), 59–109Google Scholar.

(6) There can be little doubt that Nāadir's religious policy was determined not by his LAMBreligious convictions, but by his goal of consolidating his rule over an Eastern pan- Islamic empire. Considerable evidence has recently been brought to light to suggest Nadir's Shi'ite background (see R. Ni, Sha'bī-, Siyāasat-ī Madhhabi-yi Nadir, Vahīd, VIII (1970), 1134Google Scholar–7. However, it is equally dear that he had no personal religious convictions (see Lockhart, L., Nadir Shah (London 1938), p. 278)Google Scholar.

(7) Malcolm, J., History of Pertia (London 1829), II, pp. 50–51Google Scholar; Lambton, A.K.S., Landlord and Peasant in Pertia (London 1953), pp. 131–2Google Scholar.

(8) Isfahāani, M.M., Nisf-i Jahān Ta'rīf al-Isfāhān, edited by Sotoudeh, M. (Tehran 1961/1340), pp. 256–7Google Scholar.

(9) Iqbāl, A., Vathīqa-yi Ittihād-i Islām-i Nadir, Yādigār, IV (1947), 43–6Google Scholar.

(10) Iqbal, A., ‘Aqibat-i Nādir Shāh, Yadigar, II (1945), 41–3Google Scholar.

(11) Lockhart, L., op. cit. pp. 107–8Google Scholar.

(12) The reign of the most important of the intervening rulers, Karim Khāan Zand (1747–79), is of little significance from the viewpoint of religious history. He is said by one of the more pious chroniclers of his reign never to have performed his prayers during the whole of his life; and regarded the ulema and the religious students as parasites. Karim Khāan's successors, like those of Nāadir Shတh ruling contempora- neously with them in northwestern Iran, were no more favorably disposed towards the ulemas (See Perry, J.A., Kharim Khan Zand (Chicago 1979), pp. 220–222)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

(13) Nafīsī, S., Tārikh-i Ijtim āī va Sīyāsī-yī Irān (1956/1335) I, p. 51Google Scholar.

(14) Algar, H., Religion and State in Iran, 1785–1906 (Berkeley 1969), pp. 33 sqGoogle Scholar.

(15) Ibid. ch. m.

(16) Malcolm, , op. cit. II, p. 299Google Scholar.

(17) For an account of Fatlj‘All’s repression of Sufiam see Nafīsī, S., op. cit. II, pp. 40–48Google Scholar.

(18) Browne, E.G., A Literary History of Persia (Cambridge 1924) IV, pp. 391–401Google Scholar.

(19) Prince Muhammad ‘Alī Mīrzā, one of Fatlh ‘ All’s sons and the governor of Kirmanshah, insistently purchased one gate of the Paradise from Shaykh Ahmad Ahsāi and another from Sayyid Ridā, son of the eminent Sayyid Mahdī Bahr al-Ulūm; and ordered that both deeds of sale be wrapped up with him in his shroud (ibid. IV, p. 370).

(20) Gibb, and Bowen, , op. cit. chs. EC xIIGoogle Scholar.

(21) Malcolm, , op. cit. II, p. 316Google Scholar. We only find three qadis among the religious dignitaries who signed Nāadir's ‘document on Islamic unity’ in the Najaf conference; and reference to the qadis is conspicuous its absence at the documents of the Zand period (IQBāL, , loc. cit. 1947)Google Scholar.

(22) The exceptions to this rule were the claimants to Mahdihood, the most serious of whom, Sayyid ‘Alī Muhammad, the Bāab, was executed in 1850 after the suppression of a number of chiliastic uprisings by his followers.

(23) His letters to the Ottoman Caliph, Supublished in Turkey under the title of Suret Namei Humayun (n.d.), indicate that Nadir tried to revive the pre-Safavid tribal principles of legitimacy according to which kingship was ‘the hereditary prerogative of the august Turkamāan tribe’. However after Nāadir's death, Safavid descent, with a marked emphasis on its hierocratic character, remained the most viable grounds of legitimacy for rulership. This was especially so in the case of a mujtahid of Safavid descent who ruled briefly as Supublished layman II in 1849–50 (see Perry, J.R., op. cit. pp. 1–8)Google Scholar. The view that legitimate rulership belongs to the religious doctors irrespective of Safavid descent also appears to have gained currency.

(24) The Shi'ite hierocracy appears to have kept its links with the Safavid des- cendant long after the brief reign of the learned Suleyman II mentioned in the preceding note. We still hear of a Safavid pretender with clerical support during the reign of Muhammad Shāh (1834–48) and in the period immediately following the latter's death. The Safavid legitimists circulated the rumor that the Qāajāars had been ordered to kill ‘Abbāas III the Safavid by Nāadir Shāah's son with the dagger of Shimr (the killer of the martyred third Imam, Husayn) which dagger was still in their possession (see Sa'ādat-Nūrī, H., Zill al-Sulfān (Tehran 1968/1347), I, p. 61; cfGoogle Scholar. Algār, , op. cit. pp. 100, 121, 126Google Scholar and the erroneous editorial note in Afshar, I. (ed.), Rūznāme-yi Khāṭirāt-i I'timād al-Salṭana (Tehran 1971–1972/1350), p. 56)Google Scholar.

(25) Weber, Max, Economy and Society (New York 1968), p. 1147Google Scholar.

(26) For Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsim, as for all previous political theorists, the fundamental basis of legitimate rulership was justice; and he too did consider the king the Shadow of God on Earth. But he stressed the necessity of the correct interpretation of the term ‘Shadow of God on Earth’; and in reliexplicating its ‘three meanings’, he took great care not to repeat any of the Safavids’ claims. In fact, his interpretation emphati- cally divests the ruler of divine power and divine attributes, and, for the most impor-tant part, links the term with justice and equity as ‘the shadow of divine justice’. Mirza Abu'l-Qāsim states that God has made the king His lieutenant(jānishīn) on earth[N.B., not the lieutenant of the Hidden Imām as the Safavids claimed to be], but immediately proceeds to emphasize the responsibilities implied by such an appoint-ment. In sharp, and one is tempted to say deliberate, contrast to the Safavids’ claim to Infallibility, he writes that the actions committed by the king were not necessitated by divine decree. The king's rule was a trial; he was not absolved from performing his ethical duties by virtue of kingship, and would be punished by God for all evil doing. Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāasim also stresses the interdependence of kingship and religion, noting the differentiation of political and hierocratic functions: ‘The end of the matter, he states, was that God most High had established kings for the preservation of the world of men and their protection from the evil of the wicked. Both the ‘ulanuā’ and the people had need of them. Similarly, God had established the ‘ulamā’ to protect the religion of the people […] Kings and other people needed the ‘ulamā’ to find the way of truth’ (Lambton, A.K.S., Some New Trends in Islamic Political Thought in Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Persia, Studia Islamica, XI (1974), 17–18)Google Scholar.

(27) Algar, H., op. tit. p. 79Google Scholar.

(28) The most eminent mujtahid of the time and the doyen of the hierocracy, Shaykh Ja'far, the Kāshif al-Ghiṭá (d. 1812–13/1127–8) responded by a long declaration (in Arabic) making the waging of jihād against the Russians incumbent, and authorizing Fath ‘Alī to conduct the war on behalf of the Imam of the Age. He explained that his power to authorize the King rested on the mujtahids’ collective office of nīyabāt-i ‘āmma or general Vicegerency during the Occultation of the Imām. Shaykh Ja'far did explain that the defense of Islam through jihād, a duty of the Imām according to the Sacred Law, falls upon the mujtahids by virtue of their office of nīyābat-i ‘āmma during the Occultation. He also explained that it is this duty, and his recognition as a nā'ib-i 'āmm which empowers him to authorize the ruler. Nevertheless, Shaykh Ja'far's use of the phrase: ‘I give permission’ (fa-qad adhintu), though logically unobjectionable, could be viewed as arrogant. Lambton ia therefore correct in supposing that Shaykh Ja‘far’s declaration, like those of some of the other mujtahids ‘carried with it the important corollary that they could give by this authorization validity, or at least temporary validity, to the rule of a Shah whom they appointed to engage in jihād’ (Lambton, A.K.S., A Nineteenth Century View of Jihād, Studio Islamica, XXXII (1970), p. 189)Google Scholar. However, it should also be noted that the ministers of the Qājār State who initiated and pursued the jihād policy, Qa'im Maqām the Elder, and his son Mirza Abu'l-Qāsim, Qā'im Maqām the Younger, were quite mindful of this hierocratic pretension and took prompt steps to rectify it. Qā'im Maqām the Elder's name appears as the author of a slim volume, in Persian, summarizing the views of the Shi'ite hierocracy on jihād. After being carefully read and approved by Fath ‘AlīShāh (Dunbulī, A., Ma'āthir-i Sulṭānīyya (Tabriz 1825–1826/1241), p. 145Google Scholar bis) it was printed in Tabriz in 1818 as Kitāb al-Jihādīyya and can be safely assumed to have been fairly widely read as one of the earliest printed books. Qā'im Maqām of course states that the late Shaykh Ja'far authorized Fath 'Alī Shāh on behalf of the Imām to engage in jihād. However, in a later passage he takes care, in referring to a Risāla Ghāyat al-Murād by the Shaykh, to quote him as saying: ‘If I be a man of ijtihād [authoritative derivation of legal norms] and worthy of the Vicegerency of the Imām, peace be upon Him, I give permission to the ruler, etc.’ (Qā'im-Maqām, īsā, Kitāab al-Jihādīyya (Tabriz 1818), p. 53Google Scholar.

(29) Qā'im-Maqam, A., Munsha'āt-i Qā'im-Maqām-i Farāhānī, (Āpādāna va Arastū Tehran, n. d.), pp. 199–204Google Scholar. Note the phrase: ‘The Shahanshah of the world and of the religion’ implies an overlap of religious and political authority in favor of the king. The fact underlying this overlap was that no conceptual distinction could made between Islam as religion or culture and the Islamic community as society or independent social order. For implications of this lack of differentiation, see out conclusion,

(30) Kashfī, Sayyid Ja'far, Tuhfat al- Mulūk (Tehran 1857), p. 123 aGoogle Scholar.

(31) Ibid. p. 123 b.

(32) Ibid. p. 122 a.

(33) In this case, the nīyābat is said to be 'āmma because the hadīth is issued bar vajh-i ghaybat (ibid. 126 b).

(34) Because the instructions are issued to him, bar vajh-i khitāb (ibid.).

(35) Ibid. p. 126 b.

(36) Ibid. pp. 125b–126a.

(37) Hollister, J.N., The Shi'a of India (London 1953), p. 130Google Scholar.

(38) Seen. 29 above, and pp. 72–76below.

(39) Afshar, , I'timād al-Salfana, op. cit. p. 596Google Scholar.

(40) Teymūrī, I., ‘Aṣr-i Bīkhabarī yā Tārīkh-i Imtīyāzat dar īrān (Tehran 1953–1954/1332), p.124Google Scholar.

(42) Ibid. IX, p. 379.

(43) Lambton, A.K.S., op. cit. (1953), p. 136Google Scholar.

(44) al-Salṭana, M. H. I'timād, al-Ma'āthir (Tehran 1888), p. 137Google Scholar.

(45) Majlisī, M.B., 'Ayn al-Ḥayāt (Tehran 1954). pp. 499–501Google Scholar.

(46) For examples from the very end of the nineteenth century, we may take our example from two mujtahids who led the movement against the tobacco concession in 1891–2 — Mīrzā Ḥasan Āshtīyānī the mujtahid of Tehran and Mīrzā Javād, the mahid of Tabriz— and from Sayyid 'Abdullāh Bihbāhanī, one of the two most prominent leaders of the Constitutional Revolution (see Safā'ī, I. (ed.), Asnād-i Nō-yāfte (Tehran 1971/1349), pp. 39–46. 142–3, 209)Google Scholar.

(47) Jihādīyya, p. 46.

(48) Lambton, , op. cit. pp. 139–140Google Scholar.

(49) Jihādīyya, pp. 49–50.

(50) The lengthiest discussions of ijtihād (authoritative justice competence) and its correlative taqlīd (following) occur in the early works of the period of anti-Akhbārī assertiveness such as MIrza Abu'l-Qāsim Qumī's Qawānīn al-Uṣṣl (Tehran n.d.), and Sayyid Muhammad ibn 'Alī Ṭabāṭabā'ā (d. 1826–7/1242) mafātīḥ al-Uṣūl (Tehran objecn. n.d.). There, the brunt of the arguments traditio are for the ‘permissibility’ (jawdz) of taqlīd and correspondingly for the ‘non-incumbency of ijtihdd upon each and every individual’ (‘adatn wujūb al-ijtihād 'aynan); following (a mujtahid) inthe furnwniū’ (derivative matters of Sacred Law) is permissible. It is not incumbent upon each and every individual to acquire the neces- Barrasisary knowledge to embark upon the deriva-tion of legal norms himself, as such an attempt would prevent him from gaining his livelihood. He may therefore follow the rulings of a specialist who is competent to exercise ijtihād (see Qumī, Abu'l-Qāsim, op. cit. pp. 35SGoogle Scholar sq.; and Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī, op. cit. II). However, there is no explicitassertion of the ‘incumbency’ of obedience to the mujtahids. What emerges clearly is that the aim of these writings ist to legitimate professional specialization in Sacred Law by overcoming the earlier objections, notably those of the Akhādrī traditioare nalists. Once this task was accomplished, the discussion of the topic ceased to receive much attention. As Gorji has remarked, the topic does not really belong to the jurisprudential methodology (1973–4, p. 10), and was in fact omitted from Anṣārī's Farā'id al Uṣūl (see Gorji, A., Nigāhi bi Taḥawul-i 'Ilm-i Uṣṣl, Maqālāt va Barrasisaryhā, 13–16 (Tehran 1973–1974/1352), p. 10)Google Scholar.

(51) Scarcia, G., Intorno alle controversie tra Uṣṣlī e Akhbārī presso gli Imāmiti Rivista degli Studi Orientali, XXXIII (1958), p. 237Google Scholar.

(52) Malcolm, , op. cit. II, pp. 315–6Google Scholar; and Sepsis, A., Quelques mots sur l'état religieux actuel de la Perse, Revue de I'Orient [Paris] (1844), p. 100Google Scholar.

(53) Mueller, Gert H., The notion of rationality in the work of Max Weber, European Journal of Sociology, XX (1979), 149–171CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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(55) Ibid. pp. 822–3.

(56) A. GORJI, loc. cit.

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(58) Gorji, A., Taḥqiq dar Qīyās-i Istinbāṫ, Maqālāt va Barrasī-hā, XXI-XXII (1975/1354). p. 19Google Scholar

(59) Iqbāl, A., Hujjat al-Islām Hāj Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir Shaftī, Yadigar, V, n° 10, (1949)Google Scholar.

(60) Tunikābunī, M., Qi'Ulamā’ (1878), p. 145Google Scholar.

(61) Coulson, N.J., Conflict and Tension in Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago 1969), pp. 58–60Google Scholar.

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(63) AnṣĀrī, M., Zindigānī va Shakh-ṣīyyat-i Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī, Ahwaz (1960–1961/1380), pp. 39–40Google Scholar.

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(65) Löschner, H., Die dogmatischen gnmdlagen del Schi'itschen Rechts (Köln, Carl Heymann Verlag, 1971) p. 195Google Scholar.

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(68) Weber, M., op. cit. ch. xiv, esp. p. 1173Google Scholar.

(69) Ibid. p. 54.

(70) Ḥabīb-ābiāi, M. A. Mu'allim, Ma-kārim al-Āthār (Isfahan n. d.), V, p. 1616Google Scholar. The late Safavid source, Qiṣaṣ al-Khāqāni (B.L. Or. Add. MS 7656), uses the term Ḥujjat al-Islām in a completely different sense.

(71) Iqbal, , op. cit. (1949)Google Scholar.

(72) Tunikābunī, , op. cit. p. 143Google Scholar.

(73) Ibid. pp. 144–5.

(74) Iqbal, , op. cit. (1949), p. 36Google Scholar.

(75) Sipihr, M.T., Nātikh al-Tawārīkh (Tehran 1965–1966/1344), I, esp. pp. 159–60, 168, 222, 311, 329, 345–6Google Scholar.

(76) Lambton, A.S.K., The Persian 'Ula-ma and Constitutional Reform, Le Shi'isme imāmite (Paris 1970), p. 254Google Scholar.

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(78) Lambton, , op. cit. (1970), pp. 259–260Google Scholar.

(79) Ibid. p. 261; Khurmūjī, op. cit. p. 137; Afshāar, I'timād al-Salūana, op. cit. p. 403.

(80) Chardin, J., Les voyages du che-valier Chardin en Perse, Langlés, , ed. (Paris 1811), IV, pp. 194–195Google Scholar.

(81) Malcolm, , op. cit. II, p. 315Google Scholar.

(82) I'timād al-Salṫana, op. cit. pp. 135–186.

(83) Mudakris, M. A., Ray ḥānāt al-Adah (Tabriz 1967), I, p. 41Google Scholar.

(84) Habīb-ābādi, Mu'allim, op. cit. II, p. 555Google Scholar.

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(88) Afshār, I., I'timād al-Salfana, op. cit. p. 63Google Scholar.

(89) Ibid. p. 551.

(90) Ibid. pp. 478, 538–539.

(91) Ibid. pp. 694–698.

(92) Adamīyyat, F. and Nātiq, H., Afkār-i Ijtimā'i va Sīyāīs va Iqtiṭī dar āthār-i Muntashir-nashude-yi Dawrān-i Qājār (Tehran 1977), pp. 11–19Google Scholar.

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(94) Afshār, I., I'timādal-Salṭana, op. cit. p. 137Google Scholar.

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