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Revealed preference, belief, and game theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2000

Daniel M. Hausman
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison and London School of Economics

Abstract

The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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