After the summit meeting in Moscow in June 1974, Dr. Kissinger called for a national debateon the issue of strategic arms and arms control. No such debate has taken place. It has been overtaken by the more immediate issues of inflation, the liquidity of the international banking system, and the extent to which Arab oil profits can be reduced, offset or recycled. But these more immediate issues are, in turn, dependent on what happens in the Middle East with its tripleproblem of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, the oil weapon, and Soviet ambitions to control the world's economic jugular, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The ability of the United States favorably to influence the resolution of these issues depends upon the strength of its ties with other countries with similar interests and its economicand military potential. Thus, we are once more brought face to face with the interdependence ofour economic and our national security policies.
p1 Paul H. Nitze, a former Secretary of the Navy, was Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1967 to 1969 and Senior Defense Department representative on the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Negotiations from 1969 until his resignation in the summer of 1974. See also his article “The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism,” Foreign Policy, Winter, 1975, on the pre-Vladivostok period.