Utilitas



Aristotelian Well-Being: A Response to L. W. Sumner's Critique


CHRISTOPHER HUGH TONER a1
a1 Air University christopher.toner@maxwell.af.mil

Article author query
toner ch   [Google Scholar] 
 

Abstract

Aristotle's ethical theory is often seen as instructing agents in the prudent pursuit of their own well-being, and therefore labeled egoistic. Yet it is also subject to the opposing charge of failing to direct agents to their well-being, directing them instead to perfection. I am here concerned chiefly with the second criticism, and proceed as follows: I first articulate Sumner's version of the criticism, and second assess his argument for his own (subjective) account of well-being. Third, I present reasons motivating a more objective account of well-being, reasons for taking another look at Aristotle. Finally, granting that Aristotle does indeed direct agents to pursue their perfection, I argue that perfection includes well-being within it. This shows how Aristotle escapes the second criticism, while at the same time pointing the way toward a defense against the first.

(Published Online August 21 2006)