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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 June 2009
In 1905 the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, was forced to resign as a result of a disagreement with his Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. What began as a mild bureaucratic affair soon escalated into a major power battle, and the scene of the struggle shifted in turn from the narrow confines of Indian bureaucracy to the exalted chambers of Imperial decision-makers to the public forum of two continents.
1 There are several accounts of the crisis from varying viewpoints. For a relatively sympathetic view of Curzon and Kitchener, respectively, see Fraser, Lovat, India Under Curzon and After (London, 1911)Google Scholar, and SirArthur, George, Life of Lord Kitchener, 3 vols. (London, 1920)Google Scholar, and for recent, more critical studies, see Mosley, Leonard, The Glorious Fault (New York, 1960)Google Scholar and Magnus, Philip, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist (London, 1958)Google Scholar. DrGopal, S. has devoted considerable attention to the dispute in British Policy in India, 1858–1905 (London, 1965), pp. 275–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Many Indians, especially Bengalis, held this view, and regarded Curzcm's removal as partial compensation to them for his action in partitioning Bengal. See the Amrita Bazar Patrika, Aug. 22, 1905.Google Scholar
3 Curzon's most ardent supporters, such as the editor of the Times of India, Lovat Fraser, took this stand. Fraser wrote at the time of Curzon's resignation and Lord Minto's appointment as his successor that whether or not Lord Curzon was completely justified in his criticism, “the fact remains that unfettered militarism has won the day. The sardonic and sinister figure of Lord Kitchener bestrides India, and at his word the whole fabric of constitutional government … has been weakened and impaired”. Editorial, Aug. 22, 1905. Those Indian papers which did support him – they were mostly non-Congress papers in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies – did so on the grounds that Kitchener's triumph would usher in a period of increased military expenditure as well as being a victory for the military.
4 The Times, a powerful influence on Conservative thinking, had supported Kitchener throughout the affair and was pleased to see Curzon go.
5 Balfour to St. Brodrick, John, Oct. 28, 1903Google Scholar. Midleton Papers, Add. MSS. 50,072. William St. Brodrick, John Fremantle (1856–1942) was later the ninth Viscount Midleton and first Earl of Midleton. A Conservative, he was Secretary of State for India, 1903–05, and as such he was Curzon's major contact with the Home Government. Before this appointment he had worked closely with Kitchener as Secretary of State for War.Google Scholar
6 In fact, Brodrick in 1905 argues against giving Curzon a high honor upon his enforced retirement after the dispute with Kitchener on the grounds that there were several cases of Curzon acting against the wishes of the Government, or acting provocatively, besides those of Tibet and Afghanistan. Brodrick to Francis Knollys, Sept. 4, 1905. Midleton Papers, Add. MSS. 50,072. Knollys was private secretary to Edward VII.
7 Godley, John Arthur (1847–1932), first Baron Kilbracken, was Permanent Under Secretary of State for India from 1883 to 1909: he was very influential throughout this period in the management of Indian affairs.Google Scholar
8 Godley, to Curzon, (copy), Jan. 1, 1904. Kilbracken Coll., /60a.Google Scholar
9 Godley, to Curzon, (copy), Jan. 8, 1904. Kilbracken Coll., /60.Google Scholar
10 Ibid.
11 Curzon, to Godley, , Jan. 27, 1904. Kilbracken Coll., /60.Google Scholar
12 Ibid.
13 bid.
14 Ibid. The development of an “articulate” and “powerful” public opinion did not, however, deter Curzon from offending certainly its most advanced Indian component when he partitioned Bengal amid the greatest protests. In this connection Lord Ronald shay's comment is appropriate: “it was wholly in keeping with his almost Patriarchal conception of the relations between himself and the India of bis vision, that he should have come to believe that his own judgments of what was in her interests were the judgments of the Indian people. This was the public opinion – opinion which had passed through the sieve of his own approval – which he bade the authorities in England not to ignore”. The Life of Lord Curzon, 3 vols. (London, 1928), II, 420.Google Scholar
15 Ibid. Brodrick also argued for a consideration of “public opinion”, but he meant British not Indian opinion. Brodrick, to Curzon, , Jan. 20, 1905. Midleton Papers Add. MSS. 50,077.Google Scholar
16 Also, each argued that the other man was cowing his own dissident subordinates.
17 “A Note on the Military Policy of India” (July 19, 1905). see Magnus, 223. Kitchener never really cared for the Indian Army, according to Lord Roberts. Roberts, to Curzon, , Nov. 2, 1913. Curzon Coll., /408.Google Scholar
18 Even frontier conflict was seen by Kitchener as requiring more than just Indian direction. The potential war with Afghanistan or Russia was one of vital importance to the Empire at large, he wrote, for they would require the resources of the Empire but under the existing division of labor, it would be managed by the Indian military administration. To counteract this Kitchener had advocated the removal of military policy from India and its centralization in Britain. See Kitchener's “Minute of Dissent” in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, June 23, 1905.Google Scholar
19 See Singhal, D. P., India and Afghanistan 1876–1907 (Queensland, 1963), for a study of the patterns of action of several Viceroys over one continuing crisis, the relations with Afghanistan.Google Scholar
20 “Minute of Lord Curzon”, Gazette of India Extraordinary, June 23, 1905.Google Scholar
21 Ampthill, to Brodrick, , July 7, 1904Google Scholar, in “Extracts from Private Letters from Lord Ampthill to the Secretary of State for India”. Curzon Coll., /400. Arthur O. V. Russell, second Ampthill, Baron (1869–1935) was Governor of Madras, 1900–06, and served as acting Viceroy during Curzon's absence in England between his Viceregal terms of office.Google Scholar
22 Roberts, to Kitchener, , June 18, 1903Google Scholar. Kitchener Papers, /28/GG14. Fredrick Sleigh Roberts, (1832–1914), first Earl Roberts of Kandahar, had been Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, 1885–1893, and Commander-in-Chief British Army, 1901–1904.Google Scholar
23 Kitchener, to Stedman, (copy), March 8, 1905, 18. Curzon Coll., /400. Stedman was Military Secretary at the India Office; through him Brodrick and others saw the letter, written “behind my back” according to Curzon's annotation of his copy.Google Scholar
24 Ibid., 23.
25 Ibid., 34.
28 Kitchener, and Minto, Lord, Jan. 3, 1906. Morley Papers, /39w. Morley was Brodrick's successor as Secretary of State for India under the Liberals.Google Scholar
27 Baron Sydenham of Combe. Clarke was a strong advocate of a centralized Imperial defense system, and was serving at this time on the newly formed Committee for Imperial Defence.
28 Clarke, to Kitchener, , Dec. 12, 1905. Kitchener Papers, /32/CC12.Google Scholar
29 Dual Control (Jan. 1906). Kitchener Papers, /32/CC13.Google Scholar
30 Ibid.
31 Kitchener, to Roberts, (copy), Nov. 27, 1904. Kitchener Papers, /29/Q33.Google Scholar
32 Kitchener, to Roberts, (copy), March 22, 1906. Kitchener Papers, /29/Q42.Google Scholar
33 Kitchener, to Roberts, (copy), Jan. 26, 1905Google Scholar and Kitchener, to Brodrick, (copy), July 15, 1904. Kitchener Papers, 29/Q40 and 32/CC2, respectively.Google Scholar
34 Kitchener, toSirArthur, George, Dec. 13, 1906. Kitchener Papers, /31/BB38. Kitchener favored a military man for this position, and in fact held it himself – ineffectively – during World War I.Google Scholar
35 Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon … in the Military Department (Simla, Government Central Branch Press, 1906), copy in Curzon Coll., /414.Google Scholar
36 “I wonder if you feel as I do that from the business point of view soldiers with rare exceptions are the most impossible men. They seem to me to be congenitally stupid. Their writing is atrocious … I have a few good men. But the majority fill me with despair: and as for a Military Committee – I would as soon remit a question of State to a meeting of Eton Masters”. Curzon, to Brodrick, , March 16, 1902. Midleton Papers, Add. MSS. 50,074. Both Curzon and Brodrick had been to Eton.Google Scholar
37 Curzon, to Brodrick, , Oct. 2, 1903Google Scholar, and Curzon, to Brodrick, , March 3, 1904. Midleton Papers, Add. MSS. 50,074 and 50,075, respectively.Google Scholar
38 Speech on the Budget, Viceroy's Council, March 29, 1909. Also printed in The Times, April 13, 1909.Google Scholar
39 Kitchener, and Salisbury, Lady, Jan. 25, 1903 (partial typescript copy). Kitchener Papers, /31/BB8. This letter is quoted in part in Magnus, and more fully in BlanchGoogle Scholar
40 Dugdale, E. C., Arthur James Balfour, 2 vols. (London, 1936).Google Scholar
41 Ibid.
42 Curzon, to Brodrick, , Jan. 19, 1905Google Scholar, and Curzon, to Brodrick, , June 8, 1905. Midleton Papers, Add, MSS. 50,077.Google Scholar
43 Brodrick, to Curzon, (copy), June 30, 1905. Midleton Papers, Add. MSS. 50,077.Google Scholar
44 Godley, to Curzon, (copy), March 24, 1905. Kilbracken Coll., /60.Google Scholar
45 ibid.
46 Ibid. See also Godley, to Curzon, (copy), May 11, 1905. Kilbracken Coll., /60.Google Scholar
47 Curzon, to Godley, , April 20, 1905. Kilbracken Coll., /60.Google Scholar
48 See Alexander, L. and George, Juliett L., Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York, 1956)Google Scholar, and the review by Brodie, Bernard, “A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Woodrow Wilson”, in Mazlish, Bruce, ed., Psychoanalysis and History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963).Google Scholar
49 Besides his conflict with Brodrick, and through Brodrick, the Home Government, Curzon had several clashes with Indian politicians and with informed Indian opinion. Two acts of his were particularly self-defeating: the reform of the universities and the partition of Bengal. When Curzon was forced to resign, most Indians regretted the triumph of the military, but on balance rejoiced at Curzon's downfall.
50 These spells of depression occurred in the Sudan, in South Africa, in India, and during World War I in Britain. They were severe enough to nearly incapacitate him as a decision-maker and may have contributed to his ineffectiveness as a Secretary of State for War.
51 Kitchener's public image reflected his morose personality. The public saw him as a man of gravity, seriousness, and depth, beset by enemies whom he surely overcame by his masterful ability which never verged onto overt egoism.
62 Especially Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago, 1930)Google Scholar and Power and Personality (New York, 1948)Google Scholar. Lasswell's paradigm, p→-d→r, summarizes the development of the political type in terms of motives; private motives are displaced on public objects and then rationalized in terms of the public interest. Power and Personality, 38.Google Scholar
53 They are closely related to his “administrator” and “agitator” types. Power and Personality, 62–63.Google Scholar
54 Ibid.
55 It should be made clear that Curzon paid little attention – especially in his second term as Viceroy – to the “public opinion” of vocal, educated Indians, although he had done so in his first term. Rather, he sought to appeal to the true public of India as he saw it, the huge masses of silent villagers; in Ronaldshay's words, Curzon thought himself a “modern Joshua leading the peoples committed to his charge along their divinely appointed way”. Ronaldshay, , II, 328.Google Scholar
56 For discussions of this problem see Lasswell, Power and Personality, 148 ff. and Rogow, Arnold A., James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy (New York, 1963), 344 ff.Google Scholar
57 This statement is based on the observations of several senior retired British Indian Army generals, including the last British Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck, who were interviewed in 1963. He indicated to the author that in his judgment the “Kitchener tradition” vanished with Kitchener. He and his predecessors yielded to very tight budgetary and political limitations, and even in wartime had little operational control.
58 Ray, and Strachey, Oliver, Keigwin's Rebellion (Oxford, 1916).Google Scholar
59 Davies, A. Mervyn, Clive of Plassey (London, 1939).Google Scholar
60 Cardew, Alexander, The White Mutiny (London, 1929).Google Scholar
61 Court of Proprietors of the East India Company, Discussions Between the Marquis of Dalhousie and Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. J. Napier, G.C.B. (London, 1854).Google Scholar
