¹ Figures derived from OECD, DAC, Annual Report (Paris: OECD, 1979)Google Scholar, Tables A. 1 and C. 3.

² Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Relations (Menlo Park, Cal.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar, and Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 49–52Google Scholar.

³ Mason, Edward S. and Asher, Robert E., The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 579Google Scholar.

⁴ Dell, Sidney, The Inter American Development Bank: A Study in Development Financing (New York: Praeger, 1977)Google Scholar. As Keohane, Robert has pointed out in “Hegemonic Leadership and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: Lessons for the 1980s from the ‘Long Decade’ of the 1950s” (paper prepared for the Hendricks Symposium, University of Nebraska, 04 1980)Google Scholar, the Marshall Plan was an early example of hegemonic leadership in which the United States bore costs for its allies. This is what the developing states of the western hemisphere wanted.

⁵ For an excellent discussion of the relationship between ideology and foreign aid doctrines see Packenham, Robert, Liberal America and the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973)Google Scholar. The seminal discussion of liberal absolutism is Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955)Google Scholar.

⁶ Dell, , Inter American Development Bank, pp. 80–88Google Scholar; White, John, Regional Development Banks: The Asian, African and Inter-American Development Banks (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 162–63Google Scholar; U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, Special Report on the Proposed Increase in the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank, mimeo, 03 1979, p. 6Google Scholar.

⁷ U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on HR 12731, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for FY 1979, 95th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1272. Figures include interregional and regular capital.

⁸ The purpose of callable capital is to provide a guarantee for bonds issued by multilateral development banks (MDBs). Unless an MDB cannot amortize its bonds from paid-in capital and repayments on loans, callable capital is never transferred to the bank by the pledging country. No MDB has ever failed to fulfill its obligations.

⁹ Information and figures from U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing, Hearings on HR 8905, To Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the Inter American Development Bank, 94th Cong., Ist sess., 1975, pp. 285–86; IDB, Annual Report, 1977, pp. 25–28Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Dell, , Inter-American Development Bank, pp. 59–60Google Scholar.

¹¹ IDB, Annual Reports, 1975, p. 27Google Scholar; 1977, pp. 25–29. For the 6th FSO replenishment Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico agreed to increase their convertible contribution to 75%.

¹² House, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, Increased Participation, pp. 289–92; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979, Part 5, p. CRS-134.

¹³ Figures for absolute flows show much higher correlations because of size: bigger countries have more projects, get more aid, and engage in more trade.

¹⁴ Percentages derived from information in IDB and IBRD annual reports.

¹⁵ White, , Regional Development Banks, pp. 173–86Google Scholar; Dell, , Inter American Development Bank, pp. 131–32; House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance for 1979, Part 5, pp. CRS 135–36, 206–07Google Scholar.

¹⁶ U.S., National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, Annual Report, 1977, pp. 51–52Google Scholar; Dell, , Inter-American Development Bank, p. 114; U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980, Part 6, p. 81Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Figures from U.S., National Advisory Council on International Financial and Monetary Policies, Annual Reports, 1973, p. 24Google Scholar; 1974, p. 15; 1975, p. 31; 1976, p. 37; 1977, p. 51; Dell, , Inter American Development Bank, pp. 72–73Google Scholar; Department of Treasury News, Remarks by G. William Miller before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 14 05 1980, p. 15Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Dell, , Inter American Development Bank, pp. 41 and 114Google Scholar; New York Times, 7 December 1978, p. D7.

¹⁹ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report, The United States and Multilateral Development Banks, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, pp. 26–27; White, Regional Development Banks, pp. 40–45Google Scholar.

²⁰ The following calculations do not include contributions to some small soft loan windows whose funds do not exceed $:50 million. Calculations do not include ADB replenishments agreed to but not committed by the beginning of 1980.

²¹ White, , Regional Development Banks, pp. 69 ff.Google Scholar; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States and Multilateral Development Banks, p. 25. Figures for percentage of sectoral lending from Inter American and Asian Development Banks, Annual Reports, various years.

²² Krasner, Stephen D., “The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System,” International Studies Quarterly 23 (12 1979): 493–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ In the long term it is possible to argue for a coincidence between specific American interests and stifling the spread of communism. But the kind of connection that American policymakers made between these two goals involved many steps, some of them based on wishful thinking or ideological blindness rather than careful analysis or clear empirical evidence. Economic assistance was thought to promote economic development, economic development political stability, political stability democracy, democracy anticommunism, anticommunism friendly relations with the United States. Such long threads of reasoning are not typical of foreign policymaking, because the environment is so uncertain. Policies are more likely to be successful when they involve one or two steps, not four or five. Moreover, American policymakers did not calculate costs very carefully so long as they believed that a particular policy would promote their long-term political goals. Until the late 1970s U.S. leaders showed little concern with harboring or developing American resources. Policies pursued in the name of anticommunism, especially Vietnam, damaged specific American economic interests.

²⁴ Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), chapter 9Google Scholar. See Keohane, , “Hegemonic Leadership,” for an explication of the American shift to hegemonic leadership in the late 1940sGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ White, , Regional Development Banks, pp. 82–103Google Scholar.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 106; AFDB, Annual Report, 1979, pp. 62–63, 65Google Scholar; U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, Special Report on Membership in the African Development Bank, mimeo, 03 1980, pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

²⁷ Agreement Establishing the African Development Fund, Articles 7 and 28, and AFDB, Annual Report, 1979, p. 76Google Scholar.

²⁸ Agreement Establishing the Fund, Article 30, and AFDB, Annual Report, 1979, p. 45Google Scholar.

²⁹ Department of Treasury News, Statement of C. Fred Bergsten before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 28 03 1980, pp. 23–28Google Scholar; U.S. National Advisory Council, Membership in the African Development Bank, pp. 4–19Google Scholar.

³⁰ White, , Regional Development Banks, p. 28Google Scholar.

³¹ Derived from information in AFDB, Annual Report, 1979Google Scholar; IDB, Annual Report, 1979, p. 44Google Scholar; and ADB, Annual Report, 1979, p. 23Google Scholar.