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Nuclear learning and U.S.–Soviet security regimes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Joseph S. Nye Jr
Joseph S. Nye Jr
Affiliation:
Professor of Government at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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Abstract

The concepts of regimes and learning have been developed in the Liberal theory of international relations, but their application has been mostly in the area of international political economy. U.S.–Soviet relations are generally explained solely in terms of Realist theory. The dichotomy is unfortunate because both strands of theory have something to contribute. Although the injunctions of an overall regime do not govern the U.S.–Soviet security relationship, it is possible to identify the injunctions and constraining effects of regimes in subissues of the security relationship. In five areas of the nuclear relationship (destructive power, control problems, proliferation, arms race stability, and deterrent force structure), it is possible to identify different degrees of learning and to see how such learning affects and is affected by the development of regimes. Looking at the U.S.–Soviet security relationship in terms of learning and regimes raises new questions and opens a research agenda which helps us to think more broadly about the processes of political change in this area.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , Summer 1987 , pp. 371 - 402
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1987

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