¹ This definition conforms to my earlier formulation in Young, Oran R., “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 (1980): 331–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² This formulation is not identical to that in Stephen Krasner's introduction to this collection of essays. Nonetheless, I believe it to be compatible with the definition outlined there.

³ For a somewhat similar account of social institutions in conjunction with structures of property rights see Hallowell, A. Irving, “The Nature and Function of Property as a Social Institution,” Journal of Legal and Political Sociology 1 (1943): 115–38Google Scholar.

⁴ For some suggestive thoughts on the nature and role of social conventions see Hardin, Russell, “The Emergence of Norms,” Ethics 90 (1980): 575–87 and Russell Hardin, Collective ActionCrossRefGoogle Scholar(forthcoming), chaps. 11–14

⁵ In other words, perfect compliance with social conventions is neither common nor necessary for conventions to play an influential role in human societies. For a broader study of problems of compliance see Young, Oran R., Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁶ Here again my position differs from that of some of my collaborators in this collection. I do not regard norms as defining characteristics of international regimes. Rather, I take the position that social conventions typically acquire an aura of legitimacy or propriety, which is normative in character.

⁷ On the problems of operationalizing modern utility theory see Edwards, Ward and Tversky, Amos, eds., Decision Making (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967)Google ScholarPubMed.

⁸ This view has much in common with the philosophical tenets of legal positivism as contrasted with natural law perspectives. See the well-known exchange on this distinction between Hart, H. L. A., “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law Review 71 (1958): 593–629 andGoogle ScholarFuller, Lon L., “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law Review 71 (1958): 630–71Google Scholar.

⁹ This observation is of course a cornerstone of the analysis of competitive markets in neoclassical microeconomics. For a clear exposition that stresses this point see Bator, Francis M., “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization,” American Economic Review 47 (1957): 22–59.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For the case of the French Revolution see Lefebvre, Georges, The Coming of the French Revolution, trans, by Palmer, Robert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).Google Scholar

¹¹ On the convergence of human expectations around focal points see Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), esp. chap. 4Google Scholar.

¹² For an analysis of the options available to individual actors seeking to bring about changes in prevailing institutional arrangements see Goldberg, Victor P., “Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand,” Journal of Law and Economics 17 (1974): 461–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ This is true, for example, of the situation with respect to international monetary arrangements in the aftermath of World War II.

¹⁴ This point of view may seem conservative (in the Burkean sense), but surely it is more than that. There are similar themes in many of the anarchist critiques of Marxian or authoritarian socialism as well as in many contemporary expressions of libertarianism. Skepticism about the efficacy of social engineering, therefore, is not a good indicator of ideological orientation.

¹⁵ Compare this formulation with the view articulated in Arthur Stein's contribution to this volume. I would argue that Stein, too, is concerned with coordination problems but that he focuses on only one of the three routes to solving such problems that I outline in this section.

¹⁶ See, for example, Hardin, Collective Action, on prisoners' dilemmas, ; Olson, Mancur Jr, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) on collective action problems, andGoogle ScholarHardin, Garrett and Baden, John, eds., Managing the Commons (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1977) on the tragedy of the commonsGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Hayek, Friedrich A., Rules and Order, vol. 1 of Law, Legislation, and Liberty (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), p. 37Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Thomas, C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: Norton, 1978).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Lewis, David K., Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

²⁰ For some suggestive comments phrased in terms of the concept of social conventions, however, see Hardin, Collective Action, chaps. 11–14.

²¹ The seminal work on sociobiology is Wilson, Edward O., Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

²² Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, chap. 4.

²³ But see the work on the norm of reciprocity reported in Gergen, Kenneth J., The Psychology of Behavior Exchange (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969)Google Scholar.

²⁴ Note, however, that such orders may be characterized by effective (though informal) social pressures. On the generic phenomenon of social pressure consult Kiesler, C. A. and Kiesler, Sara B., Conformity (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969).Google ScholarPubMed

²⁵ For an elaborate effort to develop the concept of the social contract as a hypothetical construct see Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

²⁶ For arguments that appear to associate the concept of “regime” exclusively with this type of order see Arthur Stein’s and Robert O. Keohane’s articles in this volume.

²⁷ On the idea of “constitutional” contracts see Buchanan, James M., The Limits of Liberty (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), esp. chap. 4Google Scholar.

²⁸ This is, of course, an insight developed extensively in the literature on neofunctionalism. For a variety of assessments of this line of enquiry consult Lindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stuart, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

²⁹ A comprehensive review of the major theories of bargaining can be found in Young, Oran R., editor and contributor, Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

³⁰ See Luce, R. Duncan and Raiffa, Howard, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957)Google Scholar.

³¹ These models are reviewed in Young, Bargaining, Part Two.

³² For a discussion of these problems based on a detailed account of international bargaining see Young, Oran R., The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

³³ On imperialism in its classic forms see Thornton, A. P., Doctrines of Imperialism (NewYork: WUey, 1965)Google Scholar.

³⁴ This theme is developed in an insightful fashion in Gilpin, Robert, “The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations,” International Organization 25 (1971): 398–419. It is also a major theme of the recent literature on dependenciaCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ For a good recent review see Baldwin, David A., “Power Analysis and World Politics,” World Politics 31 (1979): 161–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ On the idea of a habit of obedience see Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961): 49–64Google Scholar.

³⁷ Hechter, Consult Michael, Internal Colonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

³⁸ A number of regional fisheries arrangements are reviewed in Gulland, J. A., The Management of Marine Fisheries (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), chap. 7Google Scholar.

³⁹ But notice that organic conceptions of society have also been articulated by radical thinkers. To illustrate, see Kropotkin, Peter, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1972)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ For further discussion see Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ Young, Oran R., “Interdependences in World Politics,” International Journal 24 (1969): 726–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴² Hayek, Rules and Order, chap. 2.

⁴³ For an account that stresses the pervasiveness of spontaneous orders see Schelling, Micromotives.

⁴⁴ Put in other language, the transaction costs of reaching negotiated settlements rise rapidly as a function of group size. See the comments on this phenomenon in Mishan, E. J., “The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature 9 (1967), esp. pp. 21–24Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ For various reviews and critiques of the major ideas of sociobiology consult Caplan, Arthur L., ed., The Sociobiology Debate (New York: Harper Row, 1978)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ A well known account stressing the role of culture in international relations is Bozeman, Adda B., Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ For a survey of this literature consult Frohlich, Norman and Oppenheimer, Joe A., Modern Political Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), esp. chap. 1Google Scholar

⁴⁸ The terms “structure and structuralism” have been given numerous conflicting meaningsin the literature. My emphasis here is on the idea that social systems have properties (e. g., centralization, interdependence, complexity) that are attributes of these systems per se rather than of their constituent elements.

⁴⁹ For an interesting, though overly optimistic, account of these virtues see Hayek, Rules and Order, chap. 2.

⁵⁰ While this point has recently been taken up by the neoconservative movement, it is worth emphasizing that it has long been a major theme of the anarchist literature. See Guerin, Daniel, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

⁵¹ For a rich empirical account of this phenomenon see Thornton, A. P., The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁵² This is a point largely overlooked by Rawls, who assumes perfect compliance with the principles of justice accepted by actors in the original position (see Rawls, , Theory of Justice, p. 351)Google Scholar.

⁵³ See also Young, Oran R., “On the Performance of the International Polity,” British Journal of International Studies 4 (1978): 191–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ A good argument can be made to the effect that many of America's current problems at the international level stem precisely from the fact that its position of dominance has eroded substantially. On this theme, see also Liska, George, Career of Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ See Peterson, M. J., “Antarctica: The Last Great Land Rush on Earth,” International Organization 34 (1980): 377–403CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ Here again my point of view differs somewhat from that articulated in Krasner' introduction. In my judgment, this difference is attributable to the definitional issues to which I alluded at the outset.

⁵⁷ Compare the well-known query posed by philosophers: how many Chevrolet parts added to a Ford automobile would it take to transform the vehicle from a Ford into a Chevrolet?

⁵⁸ For a helpful discussion of conflicts among rights see Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), esp. chap. 4Google ScholarPubMed.

⁵⁹ To illustrate, consult Wallerstein, Immanuel M., The Capitalist World Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ For a seminal argument along these lines consult Gordon, H. Scott, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery,” Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954): 124–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶¹ For a relevant discussion of the stability conditions associated with equilibrium models see Rapoport, Anatol, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), Part 1Google Scholar.

⁶² See the helpful discussion of these reaction process models in Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), esp. chap. 2Google Scholar.

⁶³ For a collection of perspectives on dialectical reasoning see Mepham, John and Rubin, David H., eds., Issues in Marxist Philosophy, vol. 1 (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Dialectical laws are discussed in an illuminating fashion in Oilman, Bertell, Alienation: Marx's Theory of Man in Capitalist Society, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ For an early, but still pertinent, account emphasizing the prospect of such crises see Falk, Richard A., This Endangered Planet (New York: Random House, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ See Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Scribner's, 1959)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ In other words, regimes are seldom developed under conditions approximating a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.” See Rawls, Theory of Justice, chap. 3 for an account of the nature and role of the “veil of ignorance.”

⁶⁸ See also Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “Ocean Rule-Making from a World Perspective,” in Ocean Policy Project, Perspectives on Ocean Policy (Washington, 1974), pp. 221–44Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ For a critical review see Baldwin, David A., “Money and Power,” Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 578–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁰ See also Baldwin, “Power Analysis.”

⁷¹ To illustrate, compare the ideas articulated in Galtung, Johan, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research 2 (1971): 81–118 with those outlined inGoogle ScholarKeohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)Google Scholar.

⁷² For a broad account of western history stressing the role of technological change see McNeil, William H., The Rise of the West (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963). For a more specific argument to the effect that technological change is the source of many contemporary environmental problems seeGoogle ScholarCommoner, Barry, The Closing Circle (New York: Knopf, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁷³ See Brown, Seyom et al. . Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1977), esp. chaps. 11–13Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ For relevant background on world population problems consult Ehrlich, Paul R., The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine, 1968)Google ScholarPubMed.

⁷⁵ On the natural resources of the Southern Ocean see Kesteven, G. L., “The Southern Ocean,” in Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg, eds., Ocean Yearbook 1 (Chicago, 1978): 467–99Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ For an analysis of the assessment of technological change consult Lave, Lester B., Technological Change: Its Conception and Measurement (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ For non-Marxian ideas along these lines see Hegel, G. W. F., The Philosophy of History, trans, by Sibree, J. (New York: Dover, 1956) andGoogle ScholarSpengler, Oswald, The Decline of the West, abridged trans, by Atkinson, Charles F. (New York: Knopf, 1962)Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Consult Gilpin, “Politics of Transnational Relations,” for a case in point.

⁷⁶ For a thoughtful account along these lines see Haas, Ernst B., “Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (1980): 357–405CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ See Falk, This Endangered Planet, for an argument that reflects this point of view.

⁸¹ The seminal modern work on this problem is Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970). But see alsoGoogle ScholarAllison, Graham, The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) for an analysis of similar issues with special reference to international politicsGoogle Scholar.

⁸² A variety of interesting observations on this phenomenon are articulated in Wolff' critique of Rawls. See Wolff, Robert Paul, Understanding Rawls (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

⁸³ For an argument to the effect that such contracts are, in fact, nothing but interpretations