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Politics, donors and the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Uganda

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 February 2006

Roger Tangri
Affiliation:
Department of Political & Administrative Studies, University of Botswana
Andrew M. Mwenda
Affiliation:
Kampala, Uganda.

Abstract

Elite corruption in Uganda constitutes an essential means of consolidating the present government in power. Political leaders have therefore shown little commitment to act to curb practices that could affect their political support. Instead, anti-corruption institutions have been influenced and controlled whenever they threatened to expose the corrupt ways of Uganda's state elites. Donors have also for many years been reluctant to use their substantial economic assistance to press the government to confront wrongdoing by state elites. They have not wanted to undermine a government which they have held up as one of the most successful in Africa in carrying out donor-sponsored economic reforms. But by giving large amounts of aid to a corrupt and quasi-authoritarian government, as well as being reticent in their public criticism of abuse of power and corruption, donors have abetted the actions of Uganda's leaders in weakening those bodies that could hold them responsible for abusing their public positions.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
2006 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

we wish to thank two anonymous referees for many helpful comments, which have improved significantly the focus and arguments of this article.