The complexity of history and evil: a reply to Trakakis
|KIRK DURSTON a1|
a1 New Scholars Society, 7718 R.R. #2, Wallenstein, ON, Canada, N0B 2S0
I have presented an argument from the consequential complexity of history against certain types of evidential arguments from evil; ‘The consequential complexity of history and gratuitous evil’ Religious
Studies, 36 (2000), 65–80. Nick Trakakis has responded with two objections; ‘Evil and the complexity of history: a response to Durston’ Religious
Studies, 39 (2003), 451–458. He argues that the consideration of future consequences to the end of actual history may be irrelevant and, also, that one does not need detailed knowledge about possible worlds to conclude that there are better worlds. In this paper I show that, given the complexity of history, both of his objections fail to move us out of the state of agnosticism regarding what God should or should not permit. Thus, my original argument remains intact.