Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Open Peer Commentary

Moral realism and cross-cultural normative diversity

Edouard Machery a1, Daniel Kelly a2 and Stephen P. Stich a3
a1 Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 [email protected]
a2 Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2882 [email protected]
a3 Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2882 [email protected]


We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.