You can't give permission to be a bastard: Empathy and self-signaling as uncontrollable independent variables in bargaining games
George Ainslie a1 a1 Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, 116A, Coatesville, PA 19320; Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19140
George.Ainslie@va.govwww.Picoeconomics.com
Abstract
Canonical utility theory may have adopted its selfishness postulate because it lacked theoretical rationales for two major kinds of incentive: empathic utility and self-signaling. Empathy – using vicarious experiences to occasion your emotions – gives these experiences market value as a means of avoiding the staleness of self-generated emotion. Self-signaling is inevitable in anyone trying to overcome a perceived character flaw. Hyperbolic discounting of future reward supplies incentive mechanisms for both empathic utility and self-signaling. Neither can be effectively suppressed for an experimental game.
