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The Alleged Secret Pact between Athens and Philip II concerning Amphipolis and Pydna

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

G. E. M. de Sainte Croix
Affiliation:
New College, Oxford

Extract

What is the reality behind the famous phrase, in Demosthenes 2. 6? It is commonly spoken of as a secret treaty, pact, agreement, bargain, or understanding, or as a secret clause or article (all these terms have been used in recent times), between Athens and Philip II of Macedon, at some time between 359 and 357, whereby the Athenians promised to hand over their ally, Pydna, to Philip, in return for his promise to hand over Amphipolis to them.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1963

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References

page 110 1 Beloch, K. J., Gr. Gesch. iii2. i. 225–6, 229–30Google Scholar; Bengtson, H., Gr. Gesch.2, pp. 300, 301Google Scholar; Bury, J. B., Hist, of Greece3 (rev. Meiggs, R.), p. 686Google Scholar; Cloché, P., in various works, including La politique étrangère d'Athènes, pp. 154–5Google Scholar, and Un fondateur d'empire, pp. 5962Google Scholar; Geyer, F., in R-E. xix. 2Google Scholar, col. 2267, cf. 2269; Glotz, G. and Cohen, R., Hist, grecque, iii. 230–1Google Scholar; Hammond, N. G. L., Hist, of Greece, pp. 515, 538–9Google Scholar; Holm, A., Hist, of Greece (Eng. trans., 1896), iii. 210, and 220–1, n. 3Google Scholar; Ed. Meyer, , Gesch. des Alt. v. 479, 484Google Scholar; Pickard-Cambridge, A. W., Demosthenes, pp. 155–7Google Scholar, and in Camb. Anc. Hist. vi. 204, 207Google Scholar; Sandys, J. E., The First Phil, and the Olynths. of Demosth. (rev. ed., 19101954), pp. xl–xli, 161Google Scholar; Schaefer, A., Demosth. u. seine Zeit, ii 2. 1920, 21.Google Scholar Of these, Beloch and Bury speak of a ‘secret article’ in a ‘treaty’; Cloché and Hammond of a ‘pact’. Hammond, (p. 538Google Scholar) even speaks of Athens and Macedon as having ‘signed a secret pact’. Most other scholars have preferred to use rather vaguer terms.

page 110 2 Momigliano, A., Filippo il Macedone, pp. 4547. The scepticism is based on general considerations, very sensibly expressed. The discussion is brief and does not extend to die constitutional issue or the alternative interpretations of Theopomp. F 30, to be discussed below.Google Scholar

page 111 1 Presumably these allies are the Athenian cleruchs in Potidaea: see Ps.-Dem. 7. 10, where Hegesippus speaks of a sworn between Philip and (a technically correct designation of the cleruchs—miscalled in Dem. 6. 20), …. It may surprise some historians to find an Athenian cleruchy entering into a on its own account, an act for which there seems to be no known parallel. (Cf. Ps.-Arist. Oecon. 2. 2. 5, 1347a1824Google Scholar, where the same Potidaean cleruchy levies an eisphora.) But Hegesippus' statement is most explicit; and one of the scholia on Dem. 2. 7 (for what it is worth) identifies the of that passage as ‘the Potidaeans’. Many of the manuscripts of Dem. 2. 7 have after but it is probably better to delete the word, with Blass and others—unless of course we think Dem. is deliberately committing a characteristic exaggeration. Schaefer (op. cit., p. 20, n. 1Google Scholar), accepting , takes Dem. 2. 7 as a proof that in 359–358 ‘ein Vertrag zustande kam’ between Philip and Athens, and others have reached the same conclusion, for similar or different reasons. But although Athens was on friendly terms with Philip from the time he released his Athenian prisoners on the suppression of the revolt of Argaeus in 359–358 (Dem. 23. 121; Diod. 16. 4. 1; Just. 7. 6. 6) until war broke out in 356 (see Tod, ii. 157Google Scholar = I.G. ii 2. 127Google Scholar, line 41: [- , and may even have been persuaded as alleged by Diod., there was surely no between Atfiens itself and Philip at any time before 346-if there had been, Athens, by far the stronger party during the earlier years of Philip's reign (see Momigliano, , loc. cit.Google Scholar), would surely have insisted on Philip's giving a formal acknowledgement of her claim to Amphipolis; and it is evident, if only from later Athenian propaganda, that this did not happen.

page 111 2 Tod, ii. 158 (and see the notes).Google Scholar

page 111 3 Most probably in the summer of 352; but the date of the speech is not certain and may be earlier.

page 112 1 Aeschin. 2. 25–33, esp. 32–33. See the observations of Accame, S., La lega ateniese, pp. 165–6.Google Scholar The spring of 369 is plausibly suggested as the date of this congress by Accame (pp. 155–6, 164–6), and by Cawkwell, G. L., C.Q.N.S. xi (1961), 8081CrossRefGoogle Scholar; but some doubt remains.

page 112 2 Mitford, W., Hist, of Greece, iv. 270Google Scholar, after misquoting Theopomp. F 30, has some sensible remarks on this subject. No informa tion of any value for our purpose is given by the fragmentary Adienian inscription published by Meritt, B. D., in Hesp. xxx (1961), 207–8, no. 2Google Scholar, which may refer to an embassy from Macedon about the beginning of Philip II's reign.

page 112 3 See the edition of Dem. by Dindorf, W., vol. viii (1851), p. 85Google Scholar, lines 19–24. The scholion on p. 84, lines 13–18, which asserts that our phrase refers to Oropus and that the secrecy was due to the need to conceal the affair from the Thebans, can be ignored: Philip was not nearly strong enough in 359–357, even after his capture of Amphipolis, to be able to make any impression upon Athenian opinion by offering to help Athens get back Oropus from the still powerful Thebans. There may have been some confusion in the scholiast's mind with Philip's later alleged promise to hand over Oropus to Athens, which first appears in Dem. 5. 10 (346); cf. 6. 30; 19. 22, 220, 326. In all these passages Amphipolis is mentioned in the same context.

page 112 4 Tod, ii. 146Google Scholar; cf. Ps.-Dem. 7. 10; Diod. 16. 8. 5 (where the Athenian will be the cleruchs). Probably the request for the cleruchs was due to the Potidaeans' fear of falling again under Olynthian control.

page 113 1 There is a puzzle about the book number of this fragment, which is said by the lexicographers to come from Book i.e. 31, which apparently deals with the year 346 or thereabouts. Since the embassy referred to cannot of course have been later than the capture of Pydna by Philip in 357–356, Jacoby preferred to treat F 30 as coming from Book 1 (which seems to have dealt with the years 360–359), while offering as an alternative Book 3 (dealing with the years 357–356). But see n. 4 on p. 117 below.

page 113 2 See Dem. 18. 132–3; Deinarch. I (c. Dem.). 63Google Scholar; Plut. Demosth. 14. 5.Google Scholar In view of the opening words of Dem. 18. 134, the date of the execution of Antiphon cannot be later than 343, the date of the Delos affair.

page 113 3 See Dem. 23. 163–73, with Tod, ii. 151, the treaty referred to in sec. 173, which must have been made near the end of 357.Google Scholar

page 113 4 We cannot of course be certain that the two ambassadors named by Theopompus were the only ones. For important embassies (above all, those sent to negotiate treaties) three, five, or ten was the usual number of Athenian envoys. See Poland, F., De legationi-bus Graecorum publicis (Diss., Leipzig, 1885), pp. 53 ff.Google Scholar, esp. 57–63; Heyse, M., De legationibus Atticis (Diss., Göttingen, 1882), pp. 3032Google Scholar, both of whom, after setting out all the evidence available in their day, concluded that the number of ambassadors depended on the importance of their mission. Only two ambassadors are apparently sent in Thuc. 2. 67. 2 (to Sitalces); Xen. Hell. 7. I. 33Google Scholar (to the Great King); Arr. Anab. 3. 6. 2Google Scholar (to Alexander in 331); and (if Epicrates and Phormisius were the only two) in Plato Com. fr. 119 K, ap. Athen. 6. 229 f; but none of these embassies seems to have been negotiating a treaty (and see Poland, , op. cit., p. 61, with 56).Google Scholar

page 114 1 Since he is being quoted explicitly in elucidation of the mysterious phrase in Dem. 2. 6, it is unlikely that anything rele vant has been omitted by the lexicographers.

page 114 2 There seems to be no comprehensive, up-to-date work on this topic to which reference can usefully be made. See, how ever, Ch. Lécrivain, in Daremberg-Saglio, Did. des Ant. iii. 2. 1025–30Google Scholar; ii. 2. 1197ff., esp. 1206–8; also Bickerman, E., R.I.D.A. i (1952), 199213Google Scholar; Mosley, D. J., Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc. N.S. vii (1961), 5963. Most of our evidence of course relates to Athens, but the rule was doubtless the same for other de mocracies: see, e.g., Thuc. g. 40–41 (esp. 41. 3), Argos.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 114 3 Aeschin. 2. 119–20.Google Scholar

page 114 4 See the references at the end of n. 3 on p. 112 above.

page 115 1 The material passages are: Diod. 11. 39. 5; 11.42. 5; Ar. Eg. 647–50Google Scholar; Diod. 13.2.6Google Scholar; Andoc. I.45Google Scholar (cf. 15); 2.3, 19–21;Lys. 13.21; Hell. Oxy. I. 12Google Scholar (but note the Council's disclaimer); Lys. 31. 31Google Scholar; Ps.-Dem. 25. 23Google Scholar; Harp. s.v. ; Diod. 17. III. 3; perhaps Aeschin. 3. 125.Google Scholar

page 115 2 The three fifth-century examples, in all of which the word used is , are: (I) in 450, D II in A.T.L. ii. 5760Google Scholar (= S.E.G. x. 14Google Scholar ), 86 (= I.G. i 222. 73Google Scholar), fragmentary;(2) in 434, D 1 in A.T.L. ii. 4647Google Scholar (= I.G. i 2. 91Google Scholar), 7–9 makes the Council , for convening the Logistai; (3) in 415, Andoc. I. 15Google Scholar: the Council was made for investigating the affair of the Mysteries and the Hermae. In all seven of the fourth-century examples the word used is kvpía: (I) in 377. Tod, ii. 123Google Scholar (= I.G. ii 2. 43Google Scholar), 31–35: the Council is to be for destroying stelae prejudicial to the allies; (2) in (probably) 365/4, I.G. ii 2. 216 b. 3–5Google Scholar, as restored by Lewis, D. M. in B.S.A. xlix (1954), 4041Google Scholar (see S.E.G. xiv. 47Google Scholar): the Council is to be to decide anything lacking in the decree; (3) in 356, Tod, ii. 157Google Scholar (= I.G. ii 2. 127Google Scholar), 34–35: the same; (4) in 352, S.I.G 3204Google Scholar (= I.G. ii 2. 204Google Scholar), 85–86: the same; (5) Dem. 19. 154 says that in 346 the Assembly had made the Council regarding the (‘second’) embassy to Philip (which had already been voted by the Assembly), apparently because the regular Assembly days for that prytany had all been used up; (6) after 336/5, I.G. ii 2. 435. 79Google Scholar: the same as nos. 2–4; (7) in 325/4, Tod, ii. 200Google Scholar (= I.G. ii 2. 1629) 264–9Google Scholar: fact the Council added an extra quadrireme (I.G. ii 2. 1629. 272 ff.—not in Tod).Google Scholar And see Lye. c. Leocr. 37 (338). Cf.Google Scholar, outside Athens, , Tod. ii.Google Scholar 201 ( = O.G.I.S. 2), 3738Google Scholar (Mytilene, , 324Google Scholar). For an admirable brief discussion of the working of the Athenian democracy which brings out very well the role of the Council, see Jones, A. H. M., Athenian Democracy, pp. 99133.Google Scholar

page 115 3 Many of them are discussed by Cloché, , R.É.G. xxxiv (1921), 233 ff., at pp. 248–54Google Scholar (secret sessions) and 254–8 (Council .

page 115 4 The Assembly might go so far as to in struct the Council to elect ambassadors to receive the oaths of another state after the terms of the treaty had been settled (I.G. ii 2. 16 b. 1013Google Scholar, of 394), Dut even this is exceptional.

page 115 5 According to Cloche, (op. cit., p. 256)Google Scholar, there is an insinuation in Tod, ii. 200. 264–9Google Scholar (see n. 2 above) that the Council might take decisions clearly contrary to votes of the Assembly. Surely not. Of course there was always the possibility that the Council might disobey its instructions, or act carelessly. In this case the Council is simply being given a warning to take special care.

page 115 6 Among the examples involving Great Britain are the two so-called ‘Mediterranean Agreements’ of 1887 (of the first of which Lord Salisbury wrote to Queen Victoria on 10 Feb. 1887: ‘It is as close an alliance as the Parliamentary character of our institu tions will permit’); the secret clauses of the Anglo-French entente of 1904; the exchange of letters on 22 Nov. 1912 between the British Foreign Secretary and the French ambassador; the ‘secret treaty’ of Mar.-Apr. 1915 between Britain, France, and Russia regarding Constantinople and the Straits, later published by the Bolsheviks; the Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France of Jan. 1916; and the abortive ‘agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne’ of Apr.-Aug. 1917 between Britain, France, and Italy. See Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918, pp. 310–13 and 320–2, 415, 480–1, 540–2, 543, 561.Google Scholar

page 116 1 And the position was evidently much the same under many oligarchic constitutions. Although it was ‘the Four Hundred’ (Thuc. 8, chs. 70. 2; 71. 1,3; 86.9; 89. 2; 90. 1 ; 92. 2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 32. 3Google Scholar) who sent ambassadors to the Spartans to negotiate for peace in 411, the constitution set up by the oligarchs in the spring had specifically reserved to 'the Five Thousand' the right to make treaties (Ath. Pol. 29. 5Google Scholar, reporting the decisions taken at Colonus in a very different spirit from Thuc. 8, chs. 67. 2–3; 68. 1; 69. 1). In 421 the Boeotarchs of the oligarchic (Hell. Oxy. II. 2Google Scholar) Boeotian League agreed to commit the League to a series of alliances, with every expectation that their arrangements would be meekly endorsed by the Federal Council, the supreme authority in since they are referred to in the same context in the singular, : Thuc. 5. 38. 2–3Google Scholar; cf. Hell. Oxy. II. 24)Google Scholar; but the Council refused to ratify the alliances. In a close oligarchy like Sparta, however, the ephors, who had considerable powers in dealing with foreign affairs, might take it upon themselves to do things which the magistrates of a democracy would never have dared to do: see, e.g., Diod. 14. 21. 12.Google Scholar

page 116 2 See Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 1722Google Scholar; cf. Thuc. 5. 40. 341.Google Scholar 3 (Argos. The envoys appear to have been , although they are not explicitly said to be). In 392/1 the terms arranged at Sparta by Andocides and his colleagues, who were (Andoc. 3. 3334Google Scholar), were rejected by the. Assembly and the ambassadors exiled: Philoch., F. Gr. Hist, iii B 328 F 149.Google Scholar We must not assume from what Andoc. says, in his attempt to gain credit for the forty days for consideration, that the ambassadors could have accepted the Spartan terms and bound Athens thereby—the Assembly could still have repudiated their action.

page 116 3 Aeschin. 3. 96. Cf. Dem. 19. 22.Google Scholar

page 116 4 Dem. 19. 19–23 (esp. 22–23), 35–39, 42–43.

page 117 1 Aeschin. 2. 104, 120.Google Scholar Cf. Tod, ii. 123Google Scholar (= I.G. ii 2. 43), 7277.Google Scholar

page 117 2 Cf. the alleged promise of Philip to give Athens Euboea and Oropus (in return, apparently, for her abandoning her claims to Amphipolis), mentioned by Dem.—see n. 3 on p. 112 above.

page 117 3 See, e.g., Andoc. 3. 35Google Scholar; Dem. 19. 278.Google Scholar

page 117 4 If the ambassador Antiphon is indeed the man who was later disfranchised (see p. 113 above), and if he and Charidemus did negotiate with Philip about Pydna, as Theopompus says, one might be tempted to wonder whether the disfranchisement was due to the story's becoming public knowledge after Philip's capture of Pydna in 357/356. But this is highly speculative: the of 346 would be an obvious occasion for the disfranchisement, which of course need not have had anything to do with the embassy of 359–357. Mr. G. W. Bowersock has suggested to me that if the lexicographers are right in attributing F 30 of Theopomp. to Book 31 of his Philippica, (see p. 113Google Scholar, n. 1, above), then the whole story of die promise to surrender Pydna may have been introduced for the first time in 346 (to which Book 31 presumably referred), in an attempt to blacken the character of Antiphon, now regarded as an agent of Philip, and procure his disfranchisement at the .

page 117 5 The question is: had Philip acknow ledged Athens's claim to Amphipolis, (see pp. 111–12 above)Google Scholar before receiving the embassy? And if he had, why was it necessary for the ambassadors to offer him Pydna? Several scholars (notably Grote, Cloché, and Sandys) have thought of the embassy as being sent to Philip after the fall of Amphipolis. Per haps in that case a treaty of peace had in fact been concluded, as Diod. (16. 4. 1Google Scholar) says, but without the express mention of Amphipolis which he records, and the am bassadors were now seeking an unequivocal renunciation by Philip, or even the actual delivery of the city to Athens?

page 117 6 See p. 113 above.

page 117 7 Thirlwall, C., Hist, of Greece, v. 192–4, cf.Google Scholar, however, 196–7: ‘the secret compact’.

page 117 8 Grote, G., Hist, of Greece (new ed., 1888), ix. 231–2.Google Scholar

page 118 1 Philip might have pretended, for example, that he would grant the Athenians special privileges in connexion with timber which grew in areas he controlled, but that he could not afford to enter into a public treaty for the time being, as it might prejudice his relations with other states to which he was already committed.

page 118 2 As Momigliano, (loc. cit., p. 110, n. 2 aboveGoogle Scholar) was inclined to think. See the discussion of the meaning of , p. 111 above.