The Classical Quarterly (New Series)

Research Article

ΕΦΟΔΟΣ and Insinuatio In Greek and Latin Rhetoric

E. W. Bowera1

a1 The Queen's University of Belfast

The rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Anaximenes, in discussing the introduction S000983880002187X_inline1 of a speech, recognize that a speaker may encounter prejudice on the part of his audience for some reason or other; perhaps because of his own character or reputation, or because of the nature of the case he is pleading, or because his opponent has already won their approval. Anaximenes describes a speaker in this situation as S000983880002187X_inline2 and he and Aristotle give advice on countering such S000983880002187X_inline3 if they have arisen (Arist. Rhet. 3. 15; Anax. Rhet. ad Alex. 29 fin., 35 init., 36 init.). Rather more than two centuries later we find the early Latin rhetoricians expounding the doctrine of insinuatio for dealing with such a situation; they distinguish between principium, the ordinary direct introduction, and insinuatio, the ‘subtle approach’ (Caplan, in his Loeb translation of the ad Herennium, p. 13).