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North Korea's Industrial Development during the Post-War Period

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Yoon T. Kuark
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Extract

Since the end of the Second World War, which brought the division of the country into northern and southern halves, North Korea has become a thoroughly orthodox Communist state with but few deviations from the Russian type. The “Marxist-Leninist line” has been followed with fidelity and enthusiasm in the field of economic planning and organisation as laid out in both the early Five-Year Plans of Soviet Russia and in the similar pattern of socialisation in Red China. What deviation exists is said to be characteristic of the transitional period in building Socialism or a “people's democracy,” where exploiting elements still exist, as contrasted with the Soviet Union, where it is claimed “Socialism” is a reality. The government so far has launched the two One-Year Plans of 1947 and 1948, the first Two-Year Plan of 1949–50 with emphasis on Soviet assistance, the Three-Year Plan of 1954–56, the first Five-Year Plan of 1957–61, and the Seven-Year Plan of 1961–67.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 14 , June 1963 , pp. 51 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1963

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References

1 Rudolph, , Philip, , North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), pp. 61–64.Google Scholar

“In overwhelming measure North Korean political and economic institutional development has been patterned on that of the Soviet Union…. By utilising Soviet experience, North Korea could repeat much of the Soviet development pattern in a much shorter time…. Such differences as exist between the Soviet and North Korean economic institutions are in the realm of theory rather than practice (as in the case of the Soviet collective farm and the North Korean co-operative) …” (pp. 61–62).

“North Korea's pattern of socialisation has in many respects resembled that of China rather than that of Eastern Europe, particularly in economic policy since the end of the Korean War. The timing and tempo of collectivisation (although different from the Chinese commune system) closely coincided with that of China …” (p. 62).

2 Kim, G. F. “Ekonomicheskoi i Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Koreiskoi Narodno-Demokraticheskoi Respubliki (1945–50 gg.)” (“Economic and Cultural Construction in the Korean People's Democratic Republic, 1945–50”) Voprosy Istorii (1954), pp. 27–42Google Scholar. See also Pak, M. N.Iz istorii Osvoboditel'nogo dviszheniia Koreiskogo Naroda (From the History of the Liberation Movement of the Korean People) (Moscow: “Zanie,” 1955), pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

3 Bazhenov, G. N. “Koreiskaia Narodno-Demokraticheskaia Respublika no Puti Vosstanovleniia i Razciriia Narodnogo Khoziaistva” (The Korean People's Democratic Republic on the Road to Reconstruction and Development of the People's Economy). Sovetskoi Vostokovedenie, No. 2, (1956), pp. 119–127Google Scholar. Also refer to Maslennikov, V. A. (ed.), Vosstanovlenie i Razcitie Narodnogo Khoziaistva Koreiskoi Narodno-Demokraticheskoi Respubliki (Reconstruction and Development of the People's Economy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Inostrannoi Literatory, 1955), p. 186Google Scholar. A study based in part on this source is Shabad, Theodore. “North Korea's Post-war Recovery,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 25 (06 1956), pp. 81–91.Google Scholar

4 These Won figures are in old Won currency of North Korea. On February 17, 1959, the second currency reform (the former reform, in 1947) was made by which one new Won was exchanged for 100 old Won. Kyongje Konsol (Pyongyang) No. 2, 02 1959, pp. 2–3Google Scholar. After this currency reform, the exchange rate between the United Kingdom and North Korea was said to be £1: 7·2 Won. Therefore, the U.S. dollar may be valued at 2·5 Won; Japanese currency at 150 Yen to 1 Won. See Kita-Chosen no Kiroku (Records of North Korea) in Japanese (Tokyo: Shindokusho-Sha, 1960), pp. 132–133.Google Scholar

5 “Productive construction” in North Korea includes: (1) industrial construction, (2) agricultural construction, (3) transportation and communications construction, and (4) construction for commerce and social services; while “non-productive construction” includes: (1) educational and cultural construction, (2) scientific research, (3) housing, and (4) public facilities (like parks, restrooms, museums, etc.). See also Economic and Statistical Information on North Korea, JPRS (Joint Publications Research Service) 901–D, 01 15, 1960, p. 122.Google Scholar

6 Kyongje Konsol, 11 1957, p. 22Google Scholar, and Kulloja (Pyongyang), 04 1957, p. 66Google Scholar. The absolute figures in old Won in parentheses are computed by the author from percentage figures and a given total.

However rapidly their plans were accomplished, it is interesting to note that in the speech delivered by Kim Il-song before the Plenum of the Central Committees of the Labour Party in March 1954, “concerning Deficiencies in the Area of Transport and Industry and the Next Tasks of Party, Governmental and Economic Organs in Eliminating these Deficiencies,” Kim deplores widespread “bureaucratism,” “confusion” and “ignorance.”

7 Choson Chungang Nyongam 1958, (Korean Central Yearbook 1958) (Pyongyang: Choson Chungang T'ongshinsa, 1958), p. 102–104Google Scholar. Also refer to JPRS, Economic and Statistical Information on North Korea, JPRS 901–D, 01 15, 1960, pp. 1–2Google Scholar. According to the Resolution on the Concluding Report of the Third Congress of the (North) Korean Labour Party, the Five-Year Plan envisages further promoting Socialist transformation “by speeding Socialist industrialisation and by completing collectivisation of agriculture, to continue the priority development of heavy and light industry; on this basis to ensure rapid progress in all branches of the national economy thereby increasing the material and cultural living standards of our people; and thus to consolidate the source of our revolution into a mighty material base for the peaceful unification and independence of the country.”

8 Akimoto, , Hideo, , “On the Economy” and “Topics on Heavy Industry,” Kita-Chosen no Kiroku (Record of North Korea) (Tokyo: Shindokusho-Sha, 1960), pp. 75–118Google Scholar. Mr. Akimoto of the Tokyo Yomiuri Shinbun gave an eye-witness account of the “miraculous” story of how the Five-Year Plan was achieved within 2½ years. In sum, he cited: (1) “workers' enthusiasm,” (2) extensive mobilisation of labour and resources, (3) increase in labour productivity, (4) an effective incentive system, (5) increasing industrial technology, and (6) material and technical aids from the Soviet Union (1,000 million rubles), China (800 million yuan), Czechoslovakia and East Germany (capital equipment), etc., as reasons for this achievement.

9 JPRS 901–D, op. cit., pp. 26–27Google Scholar. These Won figures are in old Won.

10 JPRS, Industrial Development in North Korea. JPRS 566, 07 11, 1958, pp. 2–3Google Scholar. See also Kyongje Konsol, 03 1957, p. 83.Google Scholar

11 Kyongje Konsol, 03 1957, pp. 84–86.Google Scholar

12 Ibid.

13 Summarised from the information given in the series of Industrial Development in North Korea, JPRS 408, 566 and 704.Google Scholar

14 North Korea's Economic Development for 15 Years Since Liberation (Japanese ed.) (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960), pp. 38–39Google Scholar. Also see JPRS, op. cit., p. 172Google Scholar. Muraoka, Hiroto, a Japanese newspaperman, reports that “The North Korean Won may be worth about 150 Yen of the Japanese currency, … and compared with the Japanese price level, the North Korean prices of daily commodities are unbelievably cheaper while luxury items are far more expensive….” Muraoka, H. “Housing Construction and Citizen's Living,” Kita-Chosen no Kiroku (Record of North Korea), pp. 132–133.Google Scholar

15 JPRS, Economic Report on North Korea, JPRS 1700–N, 06 18, 1959, pp. 131–132Google Scholar. The North's new Won may be worth 200 Hwan of South Kore? as of 1959 when its exchange ratio was $1:500 Hwan.

16 North Korea's Economic Development for 15 Years Since Liberation, pp. 38–39Google Scholar. See also JPRS, Economic Report on North Korea (No. 22 of series) JPRS 2235–N, 01 29, 1960, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

17 Ibid. pp. 39–40.

18 Kita Chosen no Kiroku, pp. 96–99 and 134–135Google Scholar. Average family size here was three. See also “Housing Construction and Citizen's Life,” pp. 121–144Google Scholar, and “Culture, Arts and Sports,” pp. 173–191Google Scholar by Muraoka, H.; Narumoto, K., “Education and Welfare Sanitation,” pp. 147–169Google Scholar; and Shimizu, I., “Visit to the Farms,” pp. 195–211, in the same book.Google Scholar

19 North Korea's Economic Development, op cit., p. 40.Google Scholar

20 Karshinov, , op. cit., p. 72Google Scholar, confirmed this fact. See also Rudolph, , Philip, , “North Korea and the Path to Socialism,” Pacific Affairs, No. 2, 06 1959, pp. 133–134Google Scholar. Also see Akimoto, H., “On the Economy,” Kita-Chosen no Kiroku, p. 85.Google Scholar

21 JPRS, Economic Report on North Korea, JPRS 1291–N, 02 26, 1959, p. 78–80Google Scholar. Translated from Kyongje Konsol, 09 1958, pp. 18–23.Google Scholar

22 Time, 11 14, 1960, p. 35.Google Scholar

23 Kyongje Konsol, 09 1958, pp. 18–23.Google Scholar

24 Rudolph, , loc. cit., p. 134Google Scholar. See also New York Times, 05 31, 1955, p. 5.Google Scholar

25 Kyongje Konsol, 09 1958, pp. 18–23.Google Scholar

26 Karshinov, , op. cit., p. 59.Google Scholar

27 Time, 11 14, 1960, p. 35.Google Scholar

28 If progress in the North was so significant, the North Korean government might give production figures in absolute terms (as in South Korea) not in percentage increases. North Korean statistics are questionable, even if taken at face value.