^{page 168 note 1} “With regard to the gods, I cannot feel sure either that they are or are not, nor what they are like in figure: for there are many things that hinder sure knowledge, the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.”

^{page 169 note 1} Theaet., 165C.

^{page 170 note 1} Can this refer to the Sophistic boast of “making the worse appear the better reason,” of which the unsophisticated wrongly accused Socrates?

^{page 173 note 1} Vide Burnet, Greek Philosophy, §184, and Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work, pp. 334–336Google Scholar, who consider it Plato's expression of reluctant farewell to the theoretic life before plunging in Sicilian politics.

^{page 173 note 2} Cf. Phaedrus, 264C. “Every discourse must be organized like a living being, with a body of its own, so as to not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.”

^{page 174 note 1} Theaet., 174B.

^{page 175 note 1} This is evidently a hit at the agnosticism of Protagoras.

^{page 177 note 1} Theaet., 179B, cp. 167D and 150C. άγοςνóç ξlµi σοølaç

^{page 178 note 1} According to the Heracleiteans, we are worse off than Alice in Wonderland, for we can see neither the cat without the grin, nor the grin without the cat, nor both together.

^{page 178 note 2} Cf. Gratylus, 439C-440C. But if even the very reality or form of knowledge changes, simultaneously it would change into a form different from knowledge and there would be no knowledge; and if it is always changing, always there would be no knowledge, and according to this argument there would be nothing to know and nothing to be known.

^{page 180 note 1} Theaet., 156E,δ Φ θ αλμ δ ς ύ ρ ώ ν

^{page 180 note 2} The idea that the brain thinks is an instance of the same fallacy. The theory examined by Plato seems to be an anticipation in simple form of Behaviourism.

^{page 180 note 3} Theaet., 184D,τινι αύτών τώ άντώ

^{page 180 note 4} Ibid., 184D.

^{page 181 note 1} Theaet., 185E,είς μίαν τινά ίδέαν είτε είτε τι δεί καλείν

^{page 180 note 2} Ibid., 186B.

^{page 181 note 3} Ibid., 186C,άναλογίσματα

^{page 181 note 4} Ibid., 152C: “Perception is always of that which exists, and since it is knowledge, cannot be false.” And 160C: “Then to me my perception is true, for in each case it is always perception of what is for me.”

^{page 182 note 1} It is worth noticing that the Socratic method is the exact opposite of that of Bradley, who wrote: “before we deal with error we must gain some notion of what we mean by truth” (Appearance and Reality, 1st edition, p. 162).

^{page 182 note 2} Metaphysics, 1078b, 24.

^{page 182 note 3} Ibid., 987b, 31. Thisσκέψις έν τοίς λόγοις is ascribed to Plato, and said to be the cause of his introduction of the Ideas. But the passage is pretty evidently a reference to the passage in the Phaedo (99E), where Socrates says: “he fled for refuge to statements in order to examine the truth of things in them.”

^{page 183 note 1} Metaphysics, 1078b, 23.

^{page 183 note 2} Adamson’s, Short History of Logic, p. 23.Google Scholar

^{page 183 note 3} Mr. Poste’s translation quoted by Adamson, p. 22.

^{page 183 note 4} Diog. Laert., II. 29.γάρ ίκανός άπό τώνπραγμάτων τούς λόλονς εύρίοκειν

^{page 183 note 5} In Metaphysics, Bk. iv. 3–8, Aristotle’s refutation of Protagoras seems to be going over the ground covered more attractively in the Theaetetus.