^{page 197 note 1} This threefold analysis of consciousness is not, as J. B. Pratt has pointed out in Psychology of Religious Belief, satisfactory, since conation is not a “mode” of consciousness in the same sense that either cognition or feeling is. Conation as an element in consciousness is a particular kind of feeling, though it is extremely difficult to mark it off precisely from types of feeling which are non-conative. Stout, in his Groundwork, subsumes Conation and Feelingattitude under Interest, but his “feeling-attitude” is something much less than affect. The true distinction is one between feeling as the mode in which hitherto unconscious practical tendencies became conscious, and feeling as a response undetermined by specific innate tendencies. It is difficult to avoid using the term ‘conation’ in the conventional way, and I have not altogether been able to do so in what follows.

^{page 198 note 1} Mcdougall, in British Journal of Psychology, Vol. xvii, Pt. 3, “Pleasure, Pain, and Conation.”Google Scholar