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Dualism, Incentives and the Demands of Rawlsian Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2005

Colin Farrelly
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo

Abstract

Abstract. In normative political theory, the position called dualism maintains that the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principle. The most influential proponent of dualism is John Rawls, and his theory of “justice as fairness” has recently been criticized by the monists Liam Murphy and G.A. Cohen. In this paper I argue that if Rawlsians are going to salvage his dualistic framework from the challenge raised by Murphy and Cohen, they will have to reject Rawls's “political conception” of justice in favour of the partially comprehensive view defended in A Theory of Justice. I contend that dualism is only a viable approach to normative political theory if both aspects of the dualistic framework are emphasized.

Résumé. Dans la théorie politique normative la position du “ dualisme ” maintient que, sur le plan pratique, les deux problèmes primordiaux de la conception institutionnelle et de la conduite personnelle, nécessitent, au niveau fondamental, deux types différents de principe pratique. L'adepte le plus influent du dualisme est John Rawls dont la théorie de “ la justice comme équité ” a été critiquée récemment par les monistes Liam Murphy et G.A. Cohen. Dans cet article, je maintiens que si les partisans de Rawls comptent sauver son schéma dualiste du défi lancé par Murphy et Cohen, il va falloir qu'ils rejettent la conception politique de la justice de Rawls en faveur de la position partiellement compréhensive défendue dans “ Une théorie de la justice ”. De plus, je maintiens que le dualisme est une approche viable en théorie politique normative uniquement si les deux aspects du schéma dualiste sont mis en valeur.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2005 Cambridge University Press

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