^{page 333 note 1} Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Smith, N. K. (London: Macmillan, 1929), A471 = B499Google Scholar. All subsequent references are to this translation.

^{page 334 note 1} That this is Kant's meaning is plain from a reading of the section of the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason headed ‘Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason’.

^{page 335 note 1} See Critique of Pure Reason A636 = B664, the paragraph beginning: ‘Now I maintain …’.

^{page 335 note 2} For an account of Kant's ditherings on this subject and evidence for my interpretation see Walsh, W. H., Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Edinburgh: the University Press, 1975) pp. 236ff.Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 3} B XXX.

^{page 335 note 4} Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Beck, L. W. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 130Google Scholar. All subsequent references are to this translation. ‘Faith’ here and in the previous quotations translates ‘Glaube’ which is frequently used by Kant in other contexts to mean ‘belief’.

^{page 335 note 5} My account is derived from Roy Edgley's in his Reason in Theory and Practice (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 90ff.Google Scholar

^{page 337 note 1} See Edgley, op cit., pp. 59–60.

^{page 338 note 1} Critique of Practical Reason, p. 114.

^{page 338 note 2} loc. cit.

^{page 338 note 3} See Critique of Practical Reason, p. 118.

^{page 338 note 4} See ibid., pp. 114–15.

^{page 338 note 5} See ibid., p. 113.

^{page 339 note 1} ibid., p. 129.

^{page 339 note 2} See ibid., pp. 113, 114, 130, and 148.

^{page 339 note 3} ibid., p. 118.

^{page 340 note 1} A812/3 = B840/1. See also Lectures on Ethics, tr. Infield, L. (London: Methuen, 1939), P. 76.Google Scholar

^{page 340 note 2} A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960), p. 244.Google Scholar

^{page 340 note 3} See Commentary, p. 245.

^{page 341 note 1} This also seems to refute Kant's argument for the postulation of God's existence based on scientific progress. See Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’. At A671 = B699 he suggests that this does not support real belief, but his general, programmatic statements offer more.

^{page 342 note 1} See W. H. Walsh, op. cit., pp. 233–6, for some trenchant criticisms along these lines.