A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict

Jonas Olsona1 and Frans Svenssona1

a1 Uppsala University, jonas.olson@filosofi.uu.se, frans.svensson@filosofi.uu.se


Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We end by suggesting that our proposed position appears quite appealing since it preserves attractive elements from particularism as well as consequentialism.