Monkeying with Motives: Agent-Basing Virtue Ethics*

Julia Drivera1

a1 The City University of New York

Virtue ethics has generated a great deal of excitement among ethicists largely because it is seen as an alternative to the traditional theories – utilitarianism and Kantian ethics – which have come under considerable scrutiny and criticism in the past 30 years. Rather than give up the enterprise of doing moral theory altogether, as some have suggested, others have opted to develop an alternative that would hopefully avoid the shortcomings of both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Several writers, such as Jorge Garcia and Michael Slote, have tried to develop this alternative of virtue ethics, or at least sketch out ways such a theory could be developed.


* An earlier version of this paper was read as a comment on a paper presented by Michael Slote at the conference on Moral Obligation, held at UNC-Greensboro in April 1995.