¹ Snowden, Philip Viscount, An autobiography (London, 1934), II, 710.Google Scholar

² Taylor, A. J. P., Beaverbrook (London, 1972), pp. 223–41.Google Scholar

³ Strang, W., ‘Note on arguments used to support the contention that the Zinoviev letter is a forgery’, 17 Nov. 1924Google Scholar, Public Record Office, FO 371/10479; Crowe, Sibyl, ‘The Zinoviev letter: a reappraisal’, Journal of Contemporary History, X (1975), 415–16.Google Scholar

⁴ Grant, N., ‘The “Zinoviev letter” case’, Soviet Studies, XIX (1967–1968), 270–1.Google Scholar

⁵ Parl[amentary] Deb[ates], H[ouse] of C[ommons], 5th series, vol. 215, col. 63; Grant, ‘Zinoviev letter’, pp. 274–5.

⁶ Chester, L., Fay, S. and Young, H., The Zinoviev letter (London, 1967), ch. 5.Google Scholar

⁷ Grant, , ‘Zinoviev letter’, p. 264Google Scholar; Butler, W., ‘The Harvard text of the Zinoviev letter’, Harvard Library Bulletin, XVIII (1970), 52–3Google Scholar; Crowe, , ‘Zinoviev letter’, p. 410.Google Scholar

⁸ Parl, . Deb., H. of C., 5th series, vol. 189, cols. 673–4. A committee of the outgoing Labour cabinet, set up on 31 October to examine the letter's authenticity, found it impossible to reach a decision ‘in the short time available‘ before the government's resignation on 4 November. The committee of the Baldwin cabinet had more evidence, as well as more time, available to it.Google Scholar

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ ‘History of the Zinoviev incident’, 2nd revise, 11 Nov. 1924, FO 371/10479.

¹¹ Sir Hugh Sinclair to Crowe, 6 Nov. 1924, ibid.; Crowe, , ‘Zinoviev letter’, pp. 417–18.Google Scholar

¹² S.I.S. activities were strictly confined to areas outside the United Kingdom. The special branch played no part in providing or corroborating the Zinoviev letter (SirChilds, Wyndham, Episodes and reflections (London, 1930), p. 246Google Scholar; Marquand, D., Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), p. 388. Evidence of the letter's receipt must therefore have come from M.I. 5.Google Scholar

¹³ For earlier examples of these reports, see below, pp. 692, 701. The flow of Sovnarkom minutes continued after S.I.S. had obtained a report of its discussion of the Zinoviev letter on 25 October 1924. Reports of further Sovnarkom meetings were circulated to the cabinet by Austen Chamberlain on 22 December 1924 (copy in FO 371/10480) and in January 1925 (copy in Cambridge University Library, Baldwin MSS 230). The first of these reports provided further corroboration for the Zinoviev letter. Chicherin was alleged to have told Sovnarkom that ‘the letter upon its receipt had been destroyed by Comrade Inkpin [secretary–general of the British Communist party]’.

¹⁴ The ‘irrefutable evidence‘ which the intelligence services claimed to furnish on the weekly transfer of funds from the Russian trade delegation to the British Communist party must surely have come, at least in part, from within the party (see below, p. 692). During the 1928 commons debate on the Zinoviev letter, the attorney general, Sir Douglas Hogg, appeared to hint at the previous existence of a Communist informer. He alleged that one of the reasons for the left-wing call for a government enquiry into the letter was ‘to find out who, in the ranks of the Communist party [apparently meaning the British party], gave away the secret’ (Part. Deb., H. of C, 5th series, vol. 215, col. 93).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Chester, , Fay and Young, Zinoviev letter, p. 48.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Part. Deb., H. of C, 5th series, vol. 189, col. 674.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See below, pp. 688–91.

¹⁸ ‘History of the Zinoviev incident’, 2nd revise, 11 Nov. 1924, FO 371/10479.

¹⁹ Britain was not, of course, the only country to intercept Soviet communications. During the post-war period France and the United States were able to decrypt at least some Russian telegrams. A number of other governments also intercepted from time to time the correspondence of Comintern and the Soviet Communist party. Peters, the British envoy in Moscow, reported after the publication of the Zinoviev letter: ‘The general view [of the diplomatic corps] is that, whether this particular letter is or is not genuine, other letters of similar tenor are constantly being despatched by the Communist International to various countries.’ Peters reported the ‘somewhat similar case’ of a letter from the Soviet Communist party intercepted by the Finnish government in 1922, whose authenticity had at first been denied by the Russian government: ‘When it was established, by means of examination of the typewriting, that it was the work of the same machine as that on which various undoubtedly genuine circulars had been typed, the Soviet authorities took the fresh line that it was the work of a female typist, Miss Eva Korhonen, and that the committee of the party had nothing to do with it. The matter was dropped, as so many of these matters are.’ Peters to MacDonald, no. 1027, 4 Nov. 1924, FO 371/10479.

²⁰ The extent of the expurgation varies with the type of raw intelligence. A substantial number of special branch reports have been left by the weeders. On the other hand, an attempt has been made to remove from the files all trace of intercepted diplomatic telegrams. On British official sensitivity to the history of the intelligence services, see Christopher Andrew, ‘Whitehall, , Washington, and the intelligence services’, International Affairs, July 1977.Google Scholar

²¹ Andrew, Christopher, ‘Déchiffrement et diplomatic: le cabinet noir du quai d'Orsay sous la Troisième République’, Relations Internationales, III (1976), no. 5.Google Scholar

²² Paul to Jules Cambon, 8 Mar. 1912; Paul to Henri Cambon, 18 Mar. 1913. On the Cambons ‘ suspicion of the French cabinets noirs, see Paul to Henri Cambon, 26 Feb. 1900 and 1 Nov. 1902 (letters in the possession of M. Louis Cambon).

²³ Gooch, J., The plans of war: the general staff and British military strategy c. 1900–1916 (London, 1974), p. 32.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Cabinet memorandum, ‘Reduction of estimates for secret services’, 19 Mar. 1920, House of Lords Records Office, Lloyd George MSS F/9/2/16 (not to be found in the Public Record Office). The Foreign Office did, however, conduct some intelligence operations on its own account before 1914, notably in the Middle East, where the ‘secret fund’ was used both to win friends and to obtain information.

²⁵ Admiral SirJames, William, The eyes of the navy: a biographical study of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (London, 1955)Google Scholar; Ewing, A. W., The man of Room 40: the life of Sir Alfred Ewing (London, 1939)Google Scholar; Beesly, P., Very special intelligence: the story of the Admiralty's operational intelligence centre 1939–1945 (London, 1977), ch. 1.Google Scholar

²⁶ Cabinet memorandum, ‘Reduction of estimates for secret services’,19 Mar. 1920, Lloyd George MSS F/9/2/16.

²⁷ The Foreign Office did not, however, relieve the Admiralty of ‘responsibility for payment of the Code and Cypher School’ until April fools day, 1922. W. H. Robinson (Foreign Office) to C. E. Horsey (Admiralty), 18 Mar. 1922, FO 366/800.

²⁸ Cabinet memorandum, ‘Reduction of estimates for secret services’, 19 Mar. 1920, Lloyd George MSS F/9/2/16

²⁹ Long to Lloyd George, 9 Jan. 1919, Lloyd George MSS F/33/2/3.

³⁰ Churchill, to George, Lloyd, 19 Mar. 1920, Lloyd George MSS F/9/2/16.Google Scholar

³¹ Lockhart, R. H. Bruce, Memoirs of a British agent, 2nd edn (London, 1974), p. 277.Google Scholar

³² Reilly, , ‘Memorandum on the situation in Russia’, 5 Aug. 1921Google Scholar, Lloyd George MSS F/203/3/6. For Churchill's views and the Foreign Office reaction see Gilbert, M., Winston S. Churchill, IV (London, 1975), 760–1.Google Scholar Churchill was also a keen supporter of another ‘master spy’, Paul Dukes; see Churchill, to George, Lloyd, 20 Nov. 1919, Lloyd George MSS F/9/1/19.Google Scholar

³³ Parl. Deb., H. of C, 5th series, vol. 147, col. 2043.Google Scholar

³⁴ Cabinet memorandum, ‘Reduction of estimates for secret services’, 19 Mar. 1920, Lloyd George MSS F/9/2/16. Details of the S.I.S. budget are given in an appendix to this article.

³⁵ Andrew, , ‘Déchiffrement et diplomatic’, pp. 59–63.Google Scholar

³⁶ Yardley, H., The American Black Chamber (New York, 1931).Google Scholar

³⁷ Hankey, to George, Lloyd, 8 Sept. 1920, House of Lords Record Office, Davidson MSS (uncatalogued).Google Scholar

³⁸ In 1920 Hankey believed that the Germans were ‘decoding messages’ (ibid.). The German foreign ministry records show that during the war the Germans had decrypted some Italian diplomatic telegrams. Cf. Kahn, D., The Codebreakers: the story of secret writing (New York, 1968), p. 436.Google Scholar

³⁹ According to Hankey, ‘…the Russians were the first to introduce us to this system of de–coding, and I believe one of our most skilful experts was and is of Russian origin’ (Hankey to Lloyd George, 8 Sept. 1920, Davidson MSS). Feterljain's identity is revealed in Frunze to Lenin and others, 12 Dec. 1920, Meijer, J. M. (ed.), The Trotsky papers 1917–22 (The Hague, 1971), 11, 369.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Churchill, to Chamberlain, Austen, 21 and 22 Nov. 1924, Birmingham University Library, Chamberlain MSS, AC 51/58 & 51/61.Google Scholar

⁴¹ George, Lloyd, ‘Memorandum on the proposal to expel Messrs Kameneff and Krassin’, 2 Sept. 1920, Lloyd George MSS F/203/1/4.Google Scholar

⁴² Hankey, to George, Lloyd, 8 Sept. 1920, Davidson MSS.Google Scholar

⁴³ Ullman, R. H., Anglo–Soviet relations, III: The Anglo–Soviet accord (London, 1972). My own account owes much to Ullman's lucid analysis.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ For evidence that these messages (not discussed by Ullman) were already being intercepted at the beginning of the trade negotiations see, for example, Lloyd George MSS F/12/3/50.

⁴⁵ Ullman, , Anglo-Soviet accord, pp. 253–62, 301–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See below, p. 695.

⁴⁷ Documents on British foreign policy 1919–1939, 1st series, XII, no. 835.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ SirKaye, Cecil, Communism in India [1920–1924], 2nd edn, ed. Saha, M. (Calcutta, 1971), pp. 1–5Google Scholar; SirPetrie, David, Communism in India 1924–1927, 2nd edn, ed. Saha, M. (Calcutta, 1972), pp. 5–9. Kaye was director of the intelligence bureau of the Indian government's home department from 1919 to 1924; he was succeeded by Petrie from 1924 to 1931. Their books (originally distributed only to intelligence personnel) provide valuable summaries of most intelligence material available to the raj, with the notable exception of decrypted Soviet telegrams (evidently considered too secret for inclusion). The first editions of their works are available only in the Indian National Archives; there is no copy in the London India Office Library. Significantly the Indian editor of the reprint, though a Marxist, does not suggest that any of the intercepted documents cited by Kaye and Petrie (which include Comintern communications) were forgeries. Space does not permit an extended analysis of Indian intelligence work in this article.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Ullman, , Anglo–Soviet accord, ch. IX.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 287–9. Sinclair, D.N.I. 1919–21, was already the dominating figure in British intelligence. After a brief tour of duty as chief of the submarine service he returned to intelligence work in 1923 with the official title of ‘head of the secret service’.

⁵² conclusions, Cabinet, 15 Sept. 1920, Cab. 23/23. This leak is not discussed by Ullman.Google Scholar

⁵³ Hankey claimed that the cabinet decision not to publish the intercepts was due mainly to his warnings on the danger of ‘compromising' G.C. & C.S. Diary entry by Hankey, 15 Sept. 1920, Churchill College, Cambridge, Hankey MSS 1/5.

⁵⁴ Frunze, to Lenin, and others, 19 Dec. 1920, Trotsky papers, 11, 369Google Scholar; Ullman, , Anglo–Soviet accord, pp. 308–9. Ullman implies that British indiscretions in September had helped alert the Russians to the breaking of their codes. This appears unlikely. The Russians did not decide to change their codes until after Frunze's warning three months later. British intelligence chiefs, unaware of Frunze's warning, naturally concluded that British indiscretions were to blame. Ullman also implies that the flow of Russian intercepts was now ‘to dry up’ for a considerable, if not indefinite, period. In fact the flow resumed less than four months later.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Foreign Office confidential print, no. 11861, ‘Violations of the Russian trade agreement, 1921’ (copy in Cambridge University Library), pp. 21, 25, 45–7. This remarkable unpublished document, which the weeders appear to have overlooked (perhaps because of its innocuous title), reproduces fifty files, most including top secret intelligence material.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 47–8, 63, 75–7.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 45, 70–2.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 90–6.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 113–17.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 108, 109–n.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 153–4.

⁶² Printed memorandum on ‘classification of reports’, attached to intelligence report of 10 May 1922, Lloyd George MSS F/26/1/30.

⁶³ Owen O'Malley, ‘Memorandum on Soviet policy, March 1921–December 1922 (secret)’, 6 Feb. 1923, p. 11, India Office Library, Curzon MSS, Eur. F 112/236.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 18–20, 29–32.

⁶⁵ Cabinet conclusions, 3 May 1923, Cab. 23/45. Cf. Curzon to Bonar Law, 5 May 1923, Davidson MSS.

⁶⁶ Cmd. 1869.

⁶⁷ Cmd. 1874.

⁶⁸ Gregory, J. D., untitled memorandum on Russia, 8 Jan. 1924, Cvirzon MSS, Eur. F 112/236.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Gregory believed that one reason for the ‘almost complete lack of evidence of hostile activity by Soviet representatives in the East’ was ‘the fact that we are perhaps not now in a position to interpret the wireless messages which were the chief source for our charges in May last’ (Ibid.). The break in the flow of intercepts was to be a temporary one. How temporary, however, it is impossible to say on the basis of the evidence at present available. By the spring of 1925 G.C. & C.S. was once again decrypting Russian telegrams but it may have done so earlier. I intend to deal with the period from the Zinoviev letter to the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations in a later article.

⁷⁰ Lloyd George's comment was recorded by Fisher, H. A. L. in his diary on 9 Sept. 1920Google Scholar. Gilbert, , Churchill, IV, 429.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Curzon, to Crewe, , 2 Feb. 1923, Cambridge University Library, Crewe MSS 12.Google Scholar

⁷² Title written by Curzon on envelope containing the intercepts, Curzon MSS, Eur. F 112/320.

⁷³ Curzon, to Crewe, , 13 Oct., 12 Nov. and 12 Dec. 1923, Crewe MSS 12; Curzon to Baldwin, 9 Nov. 1923, Curzon MSS, Eur. F 112/320.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Roskill, S., Hankey: man of secrets, II (London, 1972), 353–4Google Scholar: Chester, Fay and Young, , Zinoviev letter, p. 108.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Yardley, , Black Chamber, pp. 262–3Google Scholar; Kahn, , Codebreakers, pp. 178–9.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Churchill to Austen Chamberlain, 21 Nov. 1924, Chamberlain MSS AC 51/58. Churchill would scarcely have made such a claim in a letter to the foreign secretary (who could easily check it) had he been uncertain of its truth. He had been at pains to compare the circulation of intercepts under the MacDonald and first Baldwin governments in order to urge a return to the practice of the latter. The Foreign Office's motives in withholding intercepts from MacDonald for some time may, however, have been less sinister than Churchill's letter suggests. Even allowing for Crowe's deep fear of Bolshevism, his even deeper sense of personal honour would scarcely have allowed him to conceal important information from the prime minister. But since MacDonald, as part–time foreign secretary, did not deal with much day–to–day diplomacy, Crowe may have felt for some time after the loss of the Russian diplomatic codes that no intercept was sufficiently important to require the prime minister's personal attention.

⁷⁷ Parl. Deb., H. of C, 5th series, vol. 206, 26 May 1927, cols. 2257–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ The Times, 5 Mar. 1928.

⁷⁹ Chads, , Episodes, p. 209.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, pp. 314–15.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Childs, , Episodes, pp. 224–5Google Scholar. Indian intelligence was also on the look–out for forged documents; Petrie, , Communism in India, pp. 77–82.Google Scholar

⁸² FO 371/10478.

⁸³ Memorandum by Gregory, J. D., 8 Jan. 1924, Curzon MSS, Eur. F 112/236.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Foreign Office confidential print, no. 12733 (coPy m Cambridge University Library), pp. 91–2.

⁸⁵ Minute by Maxse, 3 May 1924; Mounsey (Foreign Office) to Home Office, 12 May 1924. FO 371/10478.

⁸⁶ Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, pp. 361–3.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Part Deb., H. of C, 5th series, vol. 215, 19 Mar. 1928, col. 60.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Crowe, , ‘Zinoviev letter’, pp. 411–14Google Scholar; Chester, Fay and Young, , Zinoviev letter, pp. 191–5; Sunday Times, 15 Feb. 1970.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Part. Deb., H. of C., 5th series, vol. 215, 19 Mar. 1928, col. 62.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ The news of Reilly's execution during his 1925 Russian mission was revealed by an OGPU defector in 1927. It has since been confirmed by a best–selling Soviet ‘history’ of ‘OGPU. There have also been other, highly speculative, versions of how the ‘master spy’. met his fate. See Lockhart, R. Bruce, Ace of spies (London, 1967).Google Scholar

⁹¹ Petrie, , Communism in India, pp. 72–3Google Scholar. Further intercepted Comintern communications, reached Indian intelligence, probably from S.I.S., during 1925. Ibid., pp. 73–4.

⁹² Calhoun, D. F., The united front: the T.U.C. and the Russians 1923–1928 (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 64–5. When and in what form a report of Zinoviev's speech (later published) reached the Foreign Office is unclear. In view of its access to much more confidential Comintern information, however, it is unlikely that the Foreign Office received no report of the speech.Google Scholar

⁹³ Diary entry by MacDonald, 31 Oct. 1924, quoted in Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, p. 383. The only contribution of Marquand's generally admirable biography to the history of the Zinoviev letter is to print the relevant extracts from MacDonald's diary. Marquand takes no account of research on the letter published since 1967.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ ‘History of the Zinoviev incident’, 2nd revise, 11 Nov. 1924, FO 371/10479.

⁹⁵ Crowe, , ‘Zinoviev letter’, pp. 420–4.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, p. 381.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ ‘History of the Zinoviev incident’, 2nd revise, 11 Nov. 1924, FO 371/10479.

⁹⁸ Diary entry by MacDonald, 31 Oct. 1924, quoted by Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, P. 384.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Crowe, to MacDonald, (copy), 25 Oct. 1924, FO 371/10478.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Chester, , Fay & Young, Zinoviev letter, pp. 95–100Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Gilbert, , Churchill, III, p. 359.Google Scholar

¹⁰² James, , Eyes of the navy, pp. 112–14.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Parl. Deb., H. of C., 5th series, vol. 147, 3 Nov. 1921, col. 2044.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Chester, , Fay and Young, Zinoviev letter, pp. 99–100.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Letter from Marlowe published in The Observer, 4 Mar. 1928.

¹⁰⁴ Chester, , Fay and Young, Zinoviev letter, pp. 95–6, 100–8.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. passim. Im Thurn later extracted £10,000 from Conservative Central Office, allegedly to recompense the unidentified source who had informed him of the letter and had, he claimed, subsequently taken refuge in Argentina under a false identity. The Argentina story is an implausible one. Im Thurn also sought a knighthood for his own part in the affair.

¹⁰⁸ It is impossible to reconstruct the precise pattern of contacts between retired and serving intelligence personnel. But that there were such contacts, and that classified information reached retired agents, seems certain. Hankey's diary for 28 Nov. 1920 records a dining dub of past and present intelligence officers at which current espionage activities by Germany and Japan were among the subjects discussed. Hankey MSS 1/5.

¹⁰⁹ Chester, , Fay and Young, Zinoviev Utter, pp. 106–7.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See, on this committee, Sir Duncan Wilson's forthcoming biography of Leonard Woolf.