Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence  Government Repression

Volume 59
Issue 03 - Jul 2005
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<div style="background: #FFFFFF; margin: 10px 10px 10px 10px; padding: 10px 10px 10px 20px; text-align: left; border-top: 1px dashed #a5bbd1; border-left: 10px solid #a5bbd1; font-family: Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif;"><br> <div style="font-size: 12px; padding: 0px 0px 10px 0px; font-weight:bold; color: #003366;">Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression</div><br><div style="font-size: 10px;"><b>Emilie M. Hafner-Burton (2005).</b><br /> <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=INO">International Organization</a>, <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=INO&volumeId=59&bVolume=y#loc59 ">Volume 59</a>, <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=INO&volumeId=59&issueId=03&iid=325071"> Issue 03</a>, July 2005 pp 593-629 <br/> <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=325071">http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=325071</a></div></div>
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Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton (2005).
International Organization, Volume 59, Issue 03, July 2005 pp 593-629 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=325071

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International Organization (2005), 59 : 593-629 Cambridge University Press

doi:10.1017/S0020818305050216 (About doi)

Published online by Cambridge University Press 09 Aug 2005

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International Organization (2005), 59 : 593-629 Cambridge University Press

doi:10.1017/S0020818305050216 (About doi)

Published online by Cambridge University Press 09 Aug 2005