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³ Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), p. 5.Google Scholar

⁴ See, for example, the somewhat confused attempt of Frankel, Joseph in National Interest (London: Pall Mall, 1970), which fails to tell us why a given classification is sensible or fitting.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See, for example, Furniss, Edgar and Snyder, Richard, An Introduction to American Foreign Policy (New York: Rinehart, 1955), on p. 5Google Scholar: “The national interest is what the nation, i.e., the decision-maker decides it is.”

⁶ This seems to be James Rosenau's position in his article, “National Interest,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1968), 11: 35–40.Google Scholar

⁷ Perhaps most clearly stated in the context of the public interest debate: see Truman, David, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951)Google Scholar and Schubert, Glendon, The Public Interest (New York: Free Press, 1960).Google Scholar

⁸ Differing from this traditional Marxist point of view, Isaak Balbus tried to utilize the Marxian distinction of class an sich and für sich to render objective the notion of interest. Balbus, , “The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis,” Politics and Society 1, 2 (1978): 151–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Sondermann, Fred, “The Concept of the National Interest,” Orbis 21, 1 (1977), p. 132.Google Scholar

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¹² Quoted in Beard, Idea of the National Interest, p. 339.

¹³ Morgenthau, , Politics among Nations, p. 5.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

¹⁵ This distinction between commendatory and descriptive meaning is crucial to Hare's language analysis. See Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).Google Scholar

¹⁶ This is the Platonic fallacy of “essences” embodied in varying degrees in actual objects or actions.

¹⁷ See, for example, Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Relations (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979).Google Scholar

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¹⁹ See, for example, Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).Google Scholar

²⁰ Flathman, Richard, The Public Interest (New York: Wiley, 1966).Google Scholar

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²⁴ Meinecke, Friedrich, Die Idee der Staatsräson (Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenburg, 1929).Google Scholar

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³¹ Singer, Marcus G., Generalization in Ethics (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 5.Google Scholar

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³⁴ Ibid., p. 70.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 82.

³⁶ Plato concluded that public interest and common good are conceptions appropriately employed only by philosopher kings in discussions with other philosopher kings. If it is true that public interest functions to commend and justify public policy, and if only philosopher kings are capable of fully understanding the justifications and commendations, it follows that there would be no occasion to use the concept outside the circle of philosopher kings. Whatever one might think about the philosophical position that underlies this conclusion, the result is at variance with public interest as employed in our discourse. Flathman, , The Public Interest, pp. 56ff.Google Scholar

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³⁹ On this point, see Jouvenel, Bernard de, The Pure Theory of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), particularly chap. 2.Google Scholar

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⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 233.

⁴⁶ See Laugel, Auguste, Henry de Rohan (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1889).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ On this point, see Meinecke, , Staatsräson, chap. 6.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ In this context, it is interesting that de Rohan dedicates his De L'Interest des Princes et Éstats de la Chrestienté to Richelieu.

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⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 14–15.

⁵¹ See, for example, Frankena, W.'s position: “Prudentialism, of living wholly by the principle of self-love is just not a kind of morality.” Ethics, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 19.Google Scholar

⁵² In this context the elimination of sectarian goals is particularly important. See, for example, Frederick the Great's telling and relevant indictment of religious fervor, in “On Diplomatic Negotiations and on Just Causes for War”: “Concerning wars of religion I want to say here only that much, i.e. that a ruler should try his utmost to avoid them. Otherwise there is no word hard enough for the criminal misuse which claims for any act the word of justice and equity, which does not feel ashamed of the blasphemy and which tries to hide its striving after power behind the name of the Almighty. It is a sign of the highest order of rascality to intend to deceive the world with such unabashed pretenses….” Voltz, Gustav B., ed., Ausgewählte Werke Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1917), 2–23Google Scholar see also Frederick's sarcastic remarks in History of My Time concerning the Lutheran zealot, Christian VI of Denmark; Werke 1:56.

⁵³ Rousset, Jean, Les Intérêts Présents et les Prétensions des Puissances de l'Europe, 2d ed. (The Hague: Adrien Moetjens, 1736), 1:533.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Flathman, , The Public Interest, p. 41.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ As quoted in Gulick, Edward V., Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 32.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ For a record of the practical implications of such theories, see study, Gulick's and Kissinger, Henry, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).Google Scholar

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⁵⁹ For a justification on these grounds, see Gulick, , Europe's Classical Balance, especially chap. 11.Google Scholar

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⁶¹ Riker's theory of coalitions, sometimes quoted as a possible solution, fails, as its applicability is restricted to n-person, zero-sum games with perfect information. These conditions are hardly isomorphic with international reality. But there is an even more principled reason why Riker's “size principle” leading to “minimum winning coalitions” as developed in Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar, will generally fail even if the ideal conditions are present. See, on that point, Hardin, Russel, “Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition,” American Political Science Review 70 (12 1976): 1202–1214CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for the case of legislative coalition formation.

⁶² This is naturally the reason behind the “focal point solution” by which Thomas Schelling expanded classical game theory. For further treatment, see Schelling, , The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar and Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)Google Scholar. For an imaginative treatment of “symbolic signposts” and their role in conflict resolution, see Barkun, Michael, Law without Sanctions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).Google Scholar

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⁶⁴ Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Indeed, the more conventions attain the status of social facts and inform choices, the greater the incentive to subvert them, as the presumption of all other actors will be that the defecting actor just “made an error.”

⁶⁶ Voltz, , Ausgewählte Werke Friedrichs des Grossen, 2:66ff.Google Scholar

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⁸⁰ As quoted in Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance, p. 50.

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⁸⁵ Pflanze, Otto, Bismarck and the Development of Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 98.Google Scholar

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⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 89.

⁸⁹ Cf. Bismarck, Otto von, Erinnerung and Gedanke, chap. 22Google Scholar, in Bismarck, , Werke in Auswahl, ed. by Buchner, Rudolf (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1975), 2:360–61.Google Scholar

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⁹⁴ ibid., p. 417.

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⁹⁷ For a good short collection of essays outlining the various positions on the war-guilt question, see Lee, Dwight, ed., The Outbreak of the First World War (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975).Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁷ For this point, see Nogee, Joseph, “Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept,” Orbis 18 (Winter 1978): 1193–1224.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Waltz, , Theory of International Relations, chap. 5.Google Scholar

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