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Consciousness – subject to agreement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Neil Law Malcolm
Neil Law Malcolm
Affiliation:
Clare Hall, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB3 9AL, United Kingdommalcolm@rowland.org www.clarehall.cam.ac.uk
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Abstract

The claim that isomorphism in perceptual behaviour allows for differences in inner experience holds only if experience is taken to be an entity quite distinct from perceptual behaviour and only accidentally related to it. But this is not so. The two are internally related; experience as conceptualised being inherent to perception as a species of normative behaviour.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 6 , December 1999 , pp. 963 - 964
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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