Behavioral and Brain Sciences



Open Peer Commentary
Gold & Stoljar: A neuron doctrine

A more substantive neuron doctrine


Joe Y. F. Lau a1
a1 Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong jyflau@hkusua.hku.hk www.hku.hk/philodep/joelau

Abstract

First, it is not clear from Gold & Stoljar's definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel's theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. Second, objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. There might also be the implicit belief that, for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must invoke neurophysiological concepts and cannot be purely psychological.