PERSONS, SOCIAL AGENCY, AND CONSTITUTION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 June 2005
Abstract
The constitution view of persons, according to which a person is constituted by a body, has both interesting extensions as well as limitations. Here I shall leave discussion of the limitations for another time and concentrate on several extensions. The chief extensions of the constitution view that I shall explore here concern the implications of combining it with ontological pluralism, and applications of it (or something like it) to thinking about various forms of social agency.
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- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- © 2005 Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation
Footnotes
A version of this paper was given in February 2004 to the
philosophy colloquium at the University of Alberta; I thank my
commentator, Bernard Linsky, and members of the audience for helpful
feedback. I would also like to thank Lynne Rudder Baker and Gary Wedeking
for their reactions to an earlier version of the paper, and the other
contributors to this volume for their comments.
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