PERSONS, SOCIAL AGENCY, AND CONSTITUTION

Volume 22
Issue 02 - Jul 2005
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PERSONS, SOCIAL AGENCY, AND CONSTITUTION

Robert A. Wilson (2005).
Social Philosophy and Policy, Volume 22, Issue 02, July 2005 pp 49-69 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=312525

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Social Philosophy and Policy (2005), 22 : 49-69 Cambridge University Press

Copyright © 2005 Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation

doi:10.1017/S0265052505052039 (About doi)

Published online by Cambridge University Press 15 Jun 2005

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Social Philosophy and Policy (2005), 22:2:49-69 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 2005 Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation
doi:10.1017/S0265052505052039

PERSONS, SOCIAL AGENCY, AND CONSTITUTION ^a

Robert A. Wilson ^a1
^a1 Philosophy, University of Alberta

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Abstract

The constitution view of persons, according to which a person is constituted by a body, has both interesting extensions as well as limitations. Here I shall leave discussion of the limitations for another time and concentrate on several extensions. The chief extensions of the constitution view that I shall explore here concern the implications of combining it with ontological pluralism, and applications of it (or something like it) to thinking about various forms of social agency.

Footnotes

^a A version of this paper was given in February 2004 to the philosophy colloquium at the University of Alberta; I thank my commentator, Bernard Linsky, and members of the audience for helpful feedback. I would also like to thank Lynne Rudder Baker and Gary Wedeking for their reactions to an earlier version of the paper, and the other contributors to this volume for their comments.

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