Behavioral and Brain Sciences



Continuing Commentary
Commentary on O'Regan & Noë (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. BBS 24(5):939–1031.

An epistemological account of visual consciousness


Peter D. Sparks a1 and E. E. Krieckhaus a2
a1 Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309 sparks@psych.colorado.edu
a2 Village Information II, New York, NY 10011 krieck@worldnet.att.net

Abstract

O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) explanation of our stream of experience as activities depends on their denial of that palpable, most real aspect of experience: what they call “qualitative experience.” Given the ontological primacy of the qualitative givenness of our experience and the complete absence of actions as experiences in our stream of consciousness, though, all such reductionistic attempts must fail.