Author's Response
Millikan, R. G.: A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse
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Words, concepts, and entities: With enemies like these, I don't need friends
AbstractA number of clarifications of the target article and some
corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended
to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference
between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and
why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions
to project over them, the connection with “basic level
categories,” how it is determined what substance a given
substance concept is of, how equivocation in concepts occurs, and
the role of language in the conception of substances. Finally,
I clarify exactly why I said that concepts of individuals, real kinds,
and stuffs have “a common structure,”
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