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Distinguishing between the computational and dynamical hypotheses: What difference makes the difference?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Steven R. Quartz
Steven R. Quartz
Affiliation:
Computational Neurobiology Laboratory, The Salk Institute, La Jolla, CA 92037-1002 steve@salk.edu
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Abstract

Van Gelder seeks to distinguish between the computational and the dynamical hypotheses primarily on the basis of ontic criteria – the kind of systems cognitive agents really are. I suggest that this meets with mixed success. By shifting to epistemic criteria – what kind of explanations we require to understand cognitive agents – I suggest there is an easier and more intuitive way to distinguish between these two competing views of cognitive agents.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 5 , October 1998 , pp. 649 - 650
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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