Open Peer Commentary van Gelder: The dynamical hypothesis
Why the dynamical hypothesis cannot qualify as a law of qualitative structure
Nick Braisby a1, Richard Cooper a2andBradley Franks a3 a1 Department of Psychology, London Guildhall University, London E1 7NT
braisby@lgu.ac.uk a2 Department of Psychology, Birkbeck College, London WC1E 7HX
r.cooper@psyc.bbk.ac.uk a3 Department of Psychology, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, England
b.frank@lse.ac.uk
Abstract
Van Gelder presents the dynamical hypothesis as a novel law
of qualitative structure to compete with Newell and Simon's
(1976) physical symbol systems hypothesis. Unlike Newell and
Simon's hypothesis, the dynamical hypothesis fails to provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for cognition. Furthermore,
imprecision in the statement of the dynamical hypothesis renders
it unfalsifiable.
