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Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2005

J. Mark Ramseyer
Affiliation:
J. Mark Ramseyer is Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. Eric B. Rasmusen is Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701,,

Abstract

Theory suggests that Japanese politicians have weaker incentives than U.S. politicians to keep lower court judges independent. Accordingly, we hypothesize that Japanese lower court judges who defer on sensitive political questions will do better in their careers. To test this, we assemble several new data sets and measure the quality of the assignments received by about 400 judges after deciding various types of cases. We find that judges who deferred to the ruling party in politically salient disputes obtained better posts than those who did not, and that judges who actively enjoined the national government obtained worse posts than those who did not. We also hypothesize that judges with forthrightly leftist preferences do worse in their careers. We measure the speed at which the 500 judges hired during the 1960s moved up the pay scale and find indications that judges who joined a leftist group were promoted more slowly than their peers.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
2001 by the American Political Science Association

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