Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Continuing Commentary
Ned Block (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. BBS 18:227–287.

On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties

Güven Güzeldere a1 and Murat Aydede a2
a1 Duke University, Department of Philosophy, Durham, NC 27708 [email protected]
a2 The University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected]


We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.