Behavioral and Brain Sciences



Continuing Commentary
Ned Block (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. BBS 18:227–287.

On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties


Güven Güzeldere a1 and Murat Aydede a2
a1 Duke University, Department of Philosophy, Durham, NC 27708 guven@aas.duke.edu www.duke.edu/philosophy/faculty/guzeldere.html
a2 The University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, Chicago, IL 60637 maydede@midway.uchicago.edu http://tuna.uchicago.edu/homes/murat/index.ma.html

Abstract

We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.