Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2004), 27:5:670-670 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 2005 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0140525X0434015X

Short Communication

Inferences are just folk psychology


Thomas Metzinger a1
a1 Philosophisches Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, D-55099 Mainz, Germany metzinger@uni-mainz.de http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/

Abstract

To speak of “inferences,” “interpretations,” and so forth is just folk psychology. It creates new homunculi, and it is also implausible from a purely phenomenological perspective. Phenomenal volition must be described in the conceptual framework of an empirically plausible theory of mental representation. It is a non sequitur to conclude from dissociability that the functional properties determining phenomenal volition never make a causal contribution.



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