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Britain and the ‘Great Betrayal’: Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919–1920*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

George W. Egerton
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia

Extract

Historians have examined in great detail the dramatic debate in American politics over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles which culminated in the physical collapse of President Wilson and the defeat of his peace programme. The failure of Wilson to carry his programme through the United States senate represented also a distinct setback for the peacemaking strategies of the British government whose policies at the peace conference had been based in large measure on the hope that an enduring trans-Atlantic partnership could be established. The British government followed closely the American treaty debate, sending Viscount Grey, the former Liberal foreign secretary, as a special ambassador, and played a significant if unsuccessful role in the outcome of the drama. It is the intention of this article to examine the attitudes and role of the Lloyd George government through the latter part of 1919 and into 1920 with regard to the fate of the Treaty of Versailles in America, and in particular to reassess the part played by Viscount Grey. It is hoped to shed some new light on the dilemmas of foreign policy and defence strategy encountered at this time by Britain and the empire, as well as to elucidate certain aspects of the American struggle. Since the Covenant of the League of Nations lay at the heart of the American fight over the treaty, it is hoped also that new insight will be provided on the uncertain inauguration of the League.

Type
Articles and Communications
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

1 Imperial War Cabinet minutes, I.W.C., 31 Dec. 1918, Cab. 23/42, Public Record Office. Unless otherwise noted, all unpublished documents cited are located in the P.R.O.

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4 In a letter of 30 Dec. 1918, Grey privately advised Colonel House, Wilson's political confidante and diplomatic adviser, that the British ‘great fear’ was that ‘a League of Nations Treaty might be wrecked by the Senate in the United States’. Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon (London, 1937), pp. 348–9.Google Scholar

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6 See Nelson, H. I., Land and power: British and allied policy on Germany's frontiers, 1916–1919 (Toronto, 1963), pp. 135–6.Google Scholar Balfour advised Lloyd George that Cambon's overtures for an Anglo-French peacemaking cabal against Wilson, were ‘insanity’.Google ScholarBalfour, to George, Lloyd, 29 11 1918, F.O. 800/199.Google Scholar

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16 The instructions and published records of Grey's mission are in Woodward, E. L. and Butler, R. (eds.), Documents on British foreign policy, 1919–1939, first series, vol. v, 1919 (London, 1954).Google Scholar Unpublished material on the genesis of the mission and Grey's instructions can be found in the Lloyd George papers, House of Lords Record Office, F/12/1/30, 35, F/12/2/2; Curzon papers, India Office Library, F 112/211; and House diary, 14, 24, 28 July, 2, 12 Aug. 1919. Frances Stevenson's later version of the Grey mission that Lloyd George and Clemenceau sent Grey over ‘to tell Wilson that they would have no objection to modifying the Constitution of the League if it would make it easier for Wilson to get the U.S.A. Government to pass it’, is inaccurate. Diary entry of 17 Sept. 1934, in Taylor, A. J. P. (ed.), Lloyd George: A diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), p. 277.Google Scholar

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18 Wiseman, to Balfour, , 1 07 1919Google Scholar, Wiseman papers, Yale University Library, 90–65; also, Wiseman to Sir Ian Malcom, 1 July 1919, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 980–1. Intelligence on the American situation can be found also in F.O. 371/4245, 4371.

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22 The Lodge reservations, with subsequent amendments conveniently noted, are reprinted in Bailey, T. A., Woodrow Wilson and the great betrayal (Chicago, 1963), pp. 387–93.Google Scholar

23 Curzon, to George, Lloyd, 6 08 1919Google Scholar, Lloyd George papers, F/12/1/35. Curzon was acting foreign secretary at this time, replacing Balfour officially in October.

24 Curson, to George, Lloyd, 17 09 1919Google Scholar, Lloyd George papers, F/12/2/4. Perhaps the suggestion that Grey might meet with failure in America was not without a certain attraction for Lloyd George, for whom Grey was still a potentially dangerous political rival.

25 Grey, to George, Lloyd, 5 10 1919Google Scholar, Lloyd George papers, F/60/3/7. Perhaps Grey also now sensed the liabilities of the political tangle he faced.

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29 Grey, to Curzon, , 1 11 1919Google Scholar, ibid. p. 1914.

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32 Untitled memorandum by C. B. J. Hurst, 2 Nov. 1919, Lloyd George papers, F/12/2/3. Hurst's observations were based on a summary of the American reservations printed in The Times, 24 October 1919.

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34 Note by Hardinge on Hurst's 4 Nov. letter to Campbell.

35 Hurst, to Hardinge, Lord, 5 11 1919Google Scholar, Lloyd George papers, F/12/2/3.

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37 [P. H. Kerr], ‘Memorandum on American reservations and British ratification of the Treaty of Peace’, 10 Nov. 1919, Lord Lothian papers, GD 40/17/62. Also Lloyd George papers, F/89/4/71.

38 The Times, 12 November 1919, p. 20.

39 Wiseman, to Tyrrell, , 12 11 1919Google Scholar, Wiseman papers, 90–65; Wiseman to House, 12 Nov. 1919, House papers 12–41.

40 New York Times, 15 November 1919, p. 1; London Times, 14 November, p. 13. See also Kerr's memorandum of 14 Nov. 1919, ‘America and the League of Nations’, which reiterated at length the rationale for a policy of no reservations. Lord Lothian papers, CD 40/17/54.

41 Grayson, C. T., Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1960), p. 104.Google Scholar

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44 Willert, Arthur, The Times'Google Scholar influential Washington correspondent, was now advising Steed that the time had come ‘to play up to the Republicans’ as they were ‘almost certain to win the next election’. Willert, to Steed, , 26 11 1919Google Scholar, Willert papers, archives of The Times.

45 New York Times, 18 November 1919, p. 1.

46 Grey, to Curzon, , 17 11 1919Google Scholar, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1023.

47 Curzon, to Grey, , 18 11 1919Google Scholar, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1023. In a subsequent letter to Grey, Curzon argued that Milner was very much disturbed at the attitude of the dominions who were ‘pressing hard, in every direction, for something that is indistinguishable from independence’. According to Milner, unless they were handled with the greatest discretion a ‘rupture’ could occur at any time. Curzon, to Grey, , 22 11 1919, Curzon papers, F 112/211.Google Scholar

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49 Grey, to Curzon, , 26 11 1919Google Scholar, and Curzon's note, ibid. pp. 1038–9.

50 Details on the intriguing Crawford Stuart affair can be found in Lansing to John Davis, American ambassador to Britain, 1 Jan. 1920, John Davis papers, Yale University Library; House diary, 20 Nov., 5, 21 Dec. 1919; Chandler P, Anderson diary, Library of Congress; Lockhard, R. H. B., Giants cast long shadows (London, 1960), pp. 76–7Google Scholar; Vansittart, R., The mist procession (London, 1958), p. 120Google Scholar; and Willert, A., Washington and other memories (Boston, 1972), pp. 110, 136.Google Scholar I am indebted to James E. Hewes, Jr. and Arthur Walworth for information on the Crawford Stuart affair. Perhaps Baruch was anxious to promote Crawford Stuart's departure and therefore made sure the Wilsons were fully informed on the alleged misdemeanours.

51 Grey, to Curzon, , 2 11 1919Google Scholar, Curzon papers, F 112/211.

52 Grey, to George, Lloyd, 11 11 1919Google Scholar, Lloyd George papers, F/60/3/18.

53 Grey, to Curzon, , 23 11 1919Google Scholar, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1034. See also House diary, 23 Nov. 1919.

54 Curzon, to Grey, , 27 11 1919Google Scholar, ibid. pp. 1040–2.

55 Hurst's 18 Nov. 1919 memorandum was subsequently forwarded to Grey and is printed in ibid. pp. 1024–8. Hurst also drafted Curzon's note to Grey. Kerr to Hurst, 25 Nov. 1919, F.O. 800/158.

56 Curzon to Grey, 27 Nov. 1919, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1042–3; Kerr to Hurst, 25 Nov. 1919, Lothian papers, GD 40/17/211; Polk to Lansing, 29 Nov. 1919, United States, Department of State, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1919, The Paris peace conference (13 vols., Washington, 1942–1947), XI, 675–6.

57 A similar tactic had already occurred to Lansing. Private Memoranda, 22 Oct. 1919, Lansing papers, Library of Congress.

58 Hurst's 18 Nov. memorandum concluded that ‘The existing Covenant of the League of Nations is not by any means an ideal instrument, and if within two years it were possible to substitute an improved and simplified draft for the existing one, it would be a great advantage’.

59 Grey, to Curzon, , 28 11 1919Google Scholar, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1045. Grey's meeting with Root is noted in the Chandler P. Anderson diary, 27 Nov. 1919.

60 Curzon, to Grey, , 22 11 1919 (sent about 26 Nov., rec. about 3 Dec.), Curzon papers, F 112/211.Google Scholar

61 Grey to Curzon [6 Dec. 1919], D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1054–5.

62 Willert, to Steed, , 6 12 1919, Willert papers.Google Scholar

63 House diary, 5 Dec. 1919.

64 Willert, to Steed, , 6 12 1919Google Scholar, Willert papers; Grey, to Steed, , 29 12 1919Google Scholar, Steed papers.

65 Willert, to Steed, , 6, 19 12 1919Google Scholar; Willert, to Northcliffe, , about 14 12 1919Google Scholar, Willert, , Washington, p. 138Google Scholar, and Willert papers.

66 Smuts to prime minister, 29 Nov. 1919, included in Curzon, to Grey, , 8 12 1919Google Scholar, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1056–7.

67 Drummond, Eric to Fosdick, Raymond [15 12 1919]Google Scholar, Fosdick, R., Letters on the League of Nations: from the files of Raymond B. Fosdick (Princeton, 1966), pp. 82–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Fosdick was the American under secretary-general of the League until his resignation in Jan. 1920.

68 Bliss's memorandum began as ‘An imaginary letter to two prime ministers’, composed on 2 Dec. after conversations with a French journalist close to Clemenceau. It was given to Polk on 3 Dec. for purposes of talks with Clemenceau, then shown on 5 Dec. to Derby, the British ambassador to France, who tried unsuccessfully to have Bliss send a copy to Curzon. After amendment it was communicated on 8 Dec. to John Davis, the American ambassador to Britain. No copy of the memorandum appears to have been given directly to the British government by the Americans, but a copy was given to Clemenceau, probably by Polk. Bliss to Polk, 3 Dec. 1919, Polk papers, Yale University Library, 74/35; Derby to Curzon, 5, 16 Dec. and Bliss to Derby, 6 Dec. 1919, Curzon papers, F 112/196; Bliss to Davis, 8 Dec. 1919, Davis papers, 4/170. See also Bliss papers, Library of Congress, Box 71, for varying drafts of his ‘Imaginary letter’, and Palmer, , Bliss, peacemaker: the life and letters of General Tosher Howard Bliss (New York, 1934), pp. 422–7.Google Scholar The memorandum, author unidentified, is reprinted in D.B.F.P., first ser., II, 766–70.

69 ‘Pour ratification américain du traité: suggestion d'une déclaration franco-Anglais [sic] acceptant 10 ou 11 des 14 Réserves du Sénat américain, à condition que les trois ou quatre réserves incompatibles avec le traité disparaissent’, 9 December 1919, F.O. 371/4251. See also Sterling, R., ‘Memo on paper commt. by M. Clemenceau’Google Scholar, F.O. 371/4251.

70 Hewes, , ‘Lodge’, p. 254Google Scholar; Grey, to Curzon, , 23 11 1919Google Scholar, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 851–2.

71 According to Lodge, he had ‘many talks’ with Grey whose stay in America had taught him that the treaty contest was not simply a matter of partisan politics but involved a ‘great Constitutional question’ as between the executive and congress. Lodge to George Otto Trevelyan, 19 Jan. 1920, cited in Garraty, , Lodge, p. 387.Google Scholar Guarding their absolute secrecy, Grey made no mention of exchanges with Lodge in any of his official or private communications. See also House diary, 20 Nov. 1919, and New York Times, 2 February 1920, p. 1.

72 Lodge, to Anderson, Chandler P., 6 12 1919, Anderson papers.Google Scholar

73 Grey's three telegrams to Curzon were received 12 Dec., D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1059–61.

74 International Conference, I.C.P., 13 Dec. 1919, Cab. 29/81. Also D.B.F.F., first ser., II. 753–4.

75 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 12, 18 December 1919, pp. 727–8.

76 Ibid. pp. 733–5.

77 Ibid. pp. 767–72.

78 Grey, to Curzon, , 24 12 1919Google Scholar, D.B.F.P., first ser., v, 1064.

79 New York Times, 28 December 1919, p. 1; London Times, 29 December 1919, p. 10.

80 Steed, to Northcliffe, , 16 01 1920, Steed papers.Google Scholar

81 Kerr, to Drummond, , 18 12 1919Google Scholar, Lothian papers, G.D. 40/17/56.

82 League of Nations, Official Journal, 1, 02 1920Google Scholar, ‘Proces-Verbal of the First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations’, 16 January 1920, pp. 20–2.

83 Stone, , Irreconcilables, pp. 154–60.Google Scholar

84 Grey held up publication of the letter while senate negotiations continued, not wishing ‘to seem to play into the hands of Lodge’. Steed to Northcliffe, 18 Jan. 1920, Steed papers. Publication followed immediately upon news that the senate talks had failed.

85 Grey's letter, which probably came as no surprise to Lodge, was generally viewed as being officially inspired despite Lloyd George's public and private disclaimers of any responsibility or foreknowledge. Davis to Lansing, 6 Feb. 1920, Lansing papers, container 51; New York Times, 6 Feb. 1920; London Times, 6, 7 Feb. 1920. Most historians of the topic, including Bailey, Garraty, Stone and Boothe, L. E., ‘A fettered envoy: Lord Grey's mission to the United States, 1919–1920’, Review of Politics, XXXIII, 1 (1971), pp. 7894CrossRefGoogle Scholar, have portrayed Grey's letter as having his government's secret support. The available evidence shows that those most closely involved in the drafting of the letter included several Republicans in America, and Cecil, Steed and Northcliffe in Britain who, in fact, were attempting to have Grey resume a political career in the hope of dishing Lloyd George. Hammond, J. H., The autobiography of John Hays Hammond (2 vols. New York, 1935), 11, 649–53Google Scholar; Steed, to Northcliffe, , 16 01, 10 Feb. 1920Google Scholar, Steed to House, 11 Feb. 1920, Steed papers; The history of The Times (4 vols., London, 1952), IV, 118–19; Robbins, K., Sir Edward Grey (London, 1971), p. 355.Google Scholar Grey, however, must have reported fully to Curzon and Lloyd George, and there was ample opportunity to do this when the three of them were together in Paris, 16 Jan. 1920, for meetings of the Supreme Council and, in Grey's case, the inauguration of the League. Grey probably convinced British as well as French leaders of the wisdom of his issuing a private appeal if the senate factions deadlocked again. When published, Grey's letter received warm support not only from French newspapers close to the government (notably Le Temps and Echo de Paris) but also from the Daily Chronicle, a Lloyd George organ. On 2 Feb. the Daily Chronicle editorial suggested that Grey's counsel might ‘weigh a little with Senator Hitchcock and his friends when they finally come to decide whether they will let the mutilated treaty go through’.

If Curzon and Lloyd George viewed Grey's private démarche as tactically convenient, this did not mean that they were converted to Grey's position of accepting the Americans on their own terms. Had the treaty and the reservations passed the senate and not been pocketed by Wilson, the British government would probably have acquiesced in the reservations only on the basis of simultaneously calling for a conference to revise the Covenant so as to allow all members' responsibilities to be shared equally.

86 For the changes, see Bailey, , Wilson, pp. 387–93.Google Scholar

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88 Sir Auckland Geddes, the new British ambassador to Washington, could write to Curzon in the summer of 1920 that Wilson had never forgiven the government ‘for what he firmly believes to have been a British government repudiation of the League of Nations Covenant’. Geddes, to Curzon, , 29 06 1920Google Scholar, Lloyd George papers, F/60/4/4; also Geddes, to Curzon, , 1 07 1920Google Scholar, F.O. 800/158.

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92 Tilley, to Alston, , 11 12 1919, D.B.F.P., first ser., VI, 880Google Scholar; Fry, , Illusions of security, p. 85.Google Scholar

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94 Grey, to Seymour, , 4 07 1928Google Scholar, cited in Tillman, , Anglo-American relations, p. 400.Google Scholar Grey held Wilson himself primarily responsible for the catastrophe. House diary, 15 July 1920.

95 See [Kerr, P. H.] ‘The British empire, the League of Nations and the United States’, Round Table, x (03, 1920), 221–53.Google Scholar

96 Davis, to Lansing, , 5 12 1919, John Davis papers.Google Scholar