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22. Ibid., 109.

23. Speer, Albert, Inside the Third Reich (New York: MacMillan, 1970), 370Google Scholar. On the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, see Overy, , The Air War, 31–36Google Scholar and Murray, Williamson, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985), 1–27Google Scholar. See also Forget, Michel, “Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Luftwaffe und Heer bei den französischen und deutschen Luftstreitkräften im Zweiten Weltkrieg”Google Scholar in Boog, , ed., Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 479–525.Google Scholar

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29. Hastings, , Bomber Command, 12–33Google Scholar. See also Biddle, , Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, 200–1.Google Scholar

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32. Connelly, , Reaching for the Stars, 71–76Google Scholar. If Harris was not driven by revenge, the boulevard press in Britain certainly did take up the cry of “retribution.” The headline of the Daily Express after the Cologne raid proclaimed: “The Vengeance Begins!” Cited in Connelly, , 73Google Scholar. Similar, if more muted, sentiments were conveyed directly to Harris by the Prime Minister: “The proof of the growing power of the British Bomber Force is also the herald of what Germany will receive, city by city, from now on.” Quoted in Messenger, , “Bomber” Harris, 78.Google Scholar

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70. District report from Regensburg, December 11, 1944, BHStA, MA 106 696.

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