Malebranche's natural theodicy and the incompleteness of God's volitions
ANDREW PESSIN a1 a1 Department of Philosophy, Kenyon College, Gambier, OH 43022–9623
Abstract
The causal power of Malebranche's God is a function of the content of
His will. Yet despite its significance for Malebranche, little exegetical attention has
been paid to his notion of volitional content. In this paper I develop the notion of an
‘incomplete’ volition, note that Malebranche accepted and used something like it,
and then examine Malebranche's natural theodicy in its light. This yields a new
interpretation in which, unlike previous interpretations, Malebranche actually
succeeds in reconciling his seemingly incompatible beliefs that: (1) God alone is
causally responsible for all natural states of affairs; (2) God's power is His will; (3)
God wills to produce only goods; and yet (4) genuine evils exist.
