Kierkegaard on truth as subjectivity: Christianity,
ethics and asceticism
CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON a1 a1 27 Clifden Road, Twickenham, Middlesex TW1 4LU
Abstract
This paper is an exploration and interpretation of
Kierkegaard's account
of Christian belief. I argue that Kierkegaard believed that
the Christian metaphysical tradition was exhausted and hence
that there could be no defence of belief in
God in purely rational terms. I defend this interpretation
against objections, going
on to argue that Kierkegaard thought it possible to defend
a post-metaphysical
conception of religious belief. I argue that Kierkegaard
thought that such a defence
was available if we understand correctly what it is to speak
with ethico-religious
authority. I argue that, when interpreted in the way I outline,
Kierkegaard's notion
of ethico-religious authority shows his conception of religious
belief to have great
plausibility. However, Kierkegaard goes on to argue that an
individual's true
relationship with God is constituted through the cultivation
of guilt and the sense
of himself as a sinner, and I give reasons for rejecting
this claim, arguing that such
cultivation is a form of asceticism.