Commentary on Ned Block (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. BBS 18(2): 227–287.
Superblindsight, Inverse Anton, and tweaking A-consciousness further
|Oliver Kauffmann a1|
a1 Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, DK-2300 S., Denmark
It is argued that Block's thought experiment on superblindsight and “the Inverse Anton's syndrome” are not cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness. “Weak dispositional states” should be excluded from the set of A-conscious states, and a subject's being reflectively conscious of a P-conscious state is suggested as a better candidate for A-consciousness. It is further pointed out that dreams, according to Block's own criterion but contrary to what he claims, are A-unconscious and it is argued that Block should not accept the idea that high-information representational content is an empirically sufficient condition of phenomenality in human beings.