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Semi-presidentialism and Democratic Performance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2008

ROBERT ELGIE
Affiliation:
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Irelandrobert.elgie@dcu.ie and iain.mcmenamin@dcu.ie
IAIN MCMENAMIN
Affiliation:
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Irelandrobert.elgie@dcu.ie and iain.mcmenamin@dcu.ie

Abstract

There is a long-standing and widespread consensus that semi-presidentialism is bad for democratic performance. This article examines whether there is empirical evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism. Examining countries that are incompletely consolidated and yet are not autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the three main arguments against semi-presidentialism – the strength of the presidency, cohabitation, and divided minority government. We find that there is a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not have the negative consequences that the literature predicts.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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