The Journal of Politics
- The Journal of Politics / Volume 70 / Issue 04 / October 2008, pp 1177-1192
- Copyright © Southern Political Science Association 2008
- DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608081139 (About DOI), Published online: 16 September 2008
ARTICLES
“Nauseating” Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China
Victor Chung-Hon Shiha1
a1 Northwestern University
Abstract
Autocrats, as factional patrons, only find out the true loyalty of clients during a serious political challenge, when they are least able to enforce the factional bargain. In autocracies with norms against cults of personalities, public, exaggerated praises may constitute an alternative way for clients to signal loyalty credibly. By suffering the social cost of being despised by others, sycophants credibly signal their affinity to a particular leader, thus deterring factional rivals from recruiting them into an alternative coalition. This article develops a measure of such “nauseating” displays of loyalty in China through content analysis of provincial newspapers between 2000 and 2004. OLS and PCSE estimations are used to inquire whether provincial faction members were more likely to echo an ideological campaign launched by their patron. Further analysis explores whether faction members in rich and poor localities echoed the campaign in different ways. The findings suggest that ideological campaigns function as radars that allow senior leaders to discern the loyalty of faction members.
(Received April 02 2007)
(Accepted December 23 2007)
Footnotes
Victor Chung-Hon Shih is assistant professor of political science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208.
