Alex Byrne a1andDavid R. Hilbert a2 a1 Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 32-D808, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139
abyrne@mit.eduwww.mit.edu/~abyrne a2 Department of Philosophy and Laboratory of Integrative Neuroscience (M/C 267), University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607
hilbert@uic.eduwww.uic.edu/~hilbert
Abstract
Our reply is in four parts. The first part, R1, addresses objections to our claim that there might be “unknowable” color facts. The second part, R2, discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part, R3, examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part, R4, takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience.